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A COPERNICAN VIEW OF
HEALTH CARE ANTITRUST
WILLIAM M. SAGE* AND PETER J. HAMMER**
Diligent reader, in this work, which has just been created and published, you have the
motions of the fixed stars and planets, as these motions have been reconstituted on the
basis of ancient as well as recent observations, and have moreover been embellished
by new and marvelous hypotheses. You also have most convenient tables, from which
you will be able to compute those motions with the utmost ease for any time whatever.
Therefore buy, read, and enjoy [this work].
1

Nicholas Copernicus

I
INTRODUCTION
Is the Health Care Revolution finished? This question is open to a variety
of interpretations. “Finished” can mean completed; it can also mean terminated. “Revolution” can signify a fundamental change in ways of thinking,
paradigms, or frames of reference; it can also denote a geometric path that
eventually returns to its starting point. Indeed, modern eyes can read a similar
double entendre into the title of Nicholas Copernicus’ sixteenth century masterwork, On the Revolutions. On the one hand, Copernicus catalogued with
loving precision the positions of planets in their orbits, among the most conservative and consistent of natural phenomena. On the other hand, the Polish
astronomer’s simple diagrams and concise narrative passages quietly but insistently challenged—and eventually overturned—long-held and deeply cherished
beliefs about the origin, significance, and destiny of mankind.
This article makes no claim to insights of Copernican dimension. Still, the
transformation in scientific thought that led scholars to reject the geocentric
(earth-centered) model of the known universe that had prevailed since ancient
times in favor of a heliocentric (sun-centered) model is an apt metaphor for
attempts to harmonize the incompletely theorized blend of competition and
Copyright © 2002 by William M. Sage and Peter J. Hammer
This article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/65LCPSage.
* Professor of Law, Columbia University. Visiting Professor, Duke University School of Law, Spring
2001.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Visiting Scholar, Duke University School of
Law, Spring 2001.
This article is part of a larger project, “Competing on Quality of Care: Comparing Antitrust Law to
Market Reality,” supported by an Investigator Award in Health Policy Research from the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation. The authors thank Nancy Cooney and Aaron Hovan for research
assistance.
1. NICHOLAS COPERNICUS, ON THE REVOLUTIONS XV (Jerzy Dobrzycki ed. & Edward Rosen
trans., Johns Hopkins University Press 1978) (1543).

SAGE_FMT.DOC

242

10/02/02 1:49 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 65: No. 4

regulation that characterizes the contemporary health care system. This article
therefore proposes and explores an analogy between Copernican astronomy
and American health care. In doing so, it sketches out a new view of “competition policy”—extending beyond traditional antitrust analysis—that may be
motivating, if not fully explanatory, for legal scholars and public policy-makers.
The “revolution” that concerns us is the acceptance of competition as a
legitimate governing principle for medical services previously allocated via professional (though nonetheless profitable) processes. One can analogize precompetitive, physician-centered conceptions of health care to Ptolemaic models
that would eventually be superseded by a “Copernican” health system centered
on consumers. Antitrust law played a significant role in this reconceptualization through Supreme Court cases such as American Medical Ass’n v. United
States,2 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,3 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society,4 and FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists.5 However, the complex
position of today’s health care system in society’s grand marketplace strains
antitrust enforcement. Prevailing legal doctrine capably dismantles explicit
barriers to price competition—so-called “naked restraints on trade”—and usually manages to eliminate restrictions on output that result from the exercise of
market power. By contrast, non-price considerations such as quality, choice,
and innovation are harder to accommodate in the streamlined competitive
models utilized in conventional antitrust analysis.
In part, such limitations are endemic to antitrust law regardless of industry.
But they also reflect special problems in antitrust oversight of health care.
Having defined itself by its struggle to wrest medical markets from physician
control, antitrust law became trapped in a narrow, physician-oriented view of
health care competition, and has yet to engage fully with the health care system
as it currently exists. Dramatic increases in access to health insurance, medicine’s technological capabilities, and public and private health care expenditures not only gave rise to managed care—whose success or demise this symposium invites us to assess—but also widened the gap between the questions that
society needs answered about medical competition and the predictive capacity
of antitrust law.
A major source of backlash against managed care has been the widespread
perception that HMOs’ single-minded pursuit of low costs and high profits has
left largely unfulfilled their potential to improve quality by delivering preventive services, coordinating care, instituting early treatment, and reducing unnecessary hospitalization and surgery. One would think that quality would be a
natural subject for antitrust oversight in a newly competitive marketplace.
However, quality-based evaluation of competitive conditions has yet to occur.
Neither law nor scholarship in this area has advanced significantly beyond the
2.
3.
4.
5.

317 U.S. 519 (1943).
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
457 U.S. 332 (1982).
476 U.S. 447 (1986).
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cautionary approach of scholars in the 1980s, who feared that permitting the
medical profession to assert potential non-price benefits from collective action
might undo the fragile gains in price competition that had been achieved.6
The erosion of physicians’ economic power, coupled with the intense focus
of both public and private payers on cost containment over the last two decades, gives us reason to re-examine the prevailing wisdom regarding antitrust
and quality-based competition. Our intent is to strengthen antitrust law, not
weaken it. In significant part because of antitrust law, health care today features active price competition. Among other things, this allows new antitrust
hypotheses to be tested with less risk of merely putting the competitive genie
back into the bottle and returning to the days of unquestioned physician
hegemony.
Much as Copernicus and his successors were led to revolutionary theory by
the desire to explain discordant empirical observations, we come to this article
from recently completed empirical research on judicial opinions in health care
antitrust litigation.7 Our primary goal in that study was to determine whether
antitrust law can safeguard non-price dimensions of medical care in an increasingly competitive market. We therefore conducted a comprehensive examination of antitrust enforcement between 1985 and 1999. Using a detailed casecoding instrument as well as careful textual analysis, we reviewed over 500
judicial opinions involving medical antitrust litigation, as well as a smaller
number of consent decrees and formal administrative actions.
We reached the following conclusions from our case review. First, courts
seldom engage in detailed assessments of quality and non-price concerns.8
Second, no cogent theory of nonprice competition has been developed to guide
courts in specific cases.9 Third, historical factors and legislative interventions
often cause courts to divorce quality from competition rather than factoring it
into a competitive mix.10 Fourth, courts under-utilize analytical tools that are
available to them from other disciplines, such as health services research.11
We attribute these findings partly to the fact that medical antitrust litigation
has not kept pace or direction with changes in the overall health care system.
Health care is no longer exclusively a doctor’s world, yet antitrust law remains
preoccupied with doctors’ claims. Most cases involve disputes over medical
staff privileges or contracting practices between physicians and hospitals—a

6. Thomas L. Greaney, Competitive Reform in Health Care: The Vulnerable Revolution, 5 YALE J.
REG. 179 (1988); Thomas L. Greaney, Quality of Care and Market Failure Defenses in Antitrust
Health Care Litigation, 21 CONN. L. REV. 605, 665 (1989) (concluding that “courts should approach
market failure justifications with caution approaching trepidation”) [hereinafter Greaney, Quality of
Care].
7. Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 545 (2002).
8. Id. at 588-93.
9. Id. at 609-11.
10. Id. at 617-20.
11. Id. at 621-23.
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pattern largely unchanged from the beginning of our study period to the end.12
Consequently, courts continue to focus on overcoming professional resistance
to price discounting and corporate control, often still regarding quality as a selfregulatory rather than a consumer issue and depending on professional processes rather than competition to defend quality and promote innovation.
Managed care has not fundamentally altered courts’ assumptions regarding
nonprice competition. At most—like the refined Ptolemaic models of the universe that remained viable even in Copernicus’ time—physician-centered antitrust doctrine has been embellished in various respects to improve its performance in particular competitive circumstances involving nonprice characteristics
of health care. Notably, courts have been able in some instances to penetrate
the “market failures” that present obstacles to quality-based competition in
health care and incorporate their findings into antitrust analysis. In particular,
courts have made progress analyzing consumer choice and information as procompetitive nonprice characteristics.13 On the other hand, managed care has
increased judicial skepticism regarding the motives of insurance companies
claiming to be agents of consumers, and may have driven courts back somewhat
toward the medical profession (and non-profit hospitals) as patient representatives.
Even when courts analyze quality as a component of health care competition rather than segregating it into regulatory or self-regulatory processes apart
from the marketplace, they are likely to apply (either explicitly or implicitly) a
demand-side model. In demand-side models, augmenting provider-specific
quality increases the price that a provider can charge and/or the volume of
patients seeking the provider’s services.14 Standing alone, demand-side models
are incapable of addressing the complete range of nonprice dimensions relevant
to medical markets, particularly considerations that, rightly or wrongly, were
taken for granted in a professionally dominated health care system but that
must now be factored into the competitive mix. These include access to health
care, the knowledge base of medical science, innovation, and effects on system
stability mediated by individual and collective trust in physicians and other
health care providers.
Lessons learned about synergies and tradeoffs between price and nonprice
competition potentially apply beyond health care. The cutting edge of antitrust
law generally has moved from raw cartels producing commodities and basic

12. Id. at 567-70.
13. Id.; see also, Boczar v. Manatee Hosps. & Health Sys., 993 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1993)
(reinstating jury verdict in favor of obstetrician who offered patients a different style of practice).
14. The invocation of demand-side models also explains why a number of courts have been
reluctant to infer the existence of “market power” from evidence of higher medical prices, unadjusted
for quality differences. See Doctor’s Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Southeast Med. Alliance, Inc., 123 F.3d
301, 310 (5th Cir. 1997) (“In medical care, it must be remembered, a provider’s higher prices are not
necessarily indicative of a less competitive market; they may correlate with better services or more
experienced providers.”); see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1411-12
(7th Cir. 1995) (“Generally, you must pay more for higher quality.”).
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search goods to more complex sectors of the economy such as banking and telecommunications. These innovative, quality-dependent, socially important
industries are frequently regulated, and may even receive public subsidies for
research or service. They are not necessarily “professionalized,” even though
professionals typically supply experience or credence goods whose nonprice
attributes matter to consumers, and the historical dominance of physicians in
the economics of American medicine undoubtedly imbues the health care
system with “professional” traits. Neither is guild governance sufficient to place
a sector of economic activity within our model. For example, medicine may be
different for antitrust purposes from other professions, such as law and engineering, even though the early history of antitrust enforcement involving the
professions moved in tandem.
In Part II, we elaborate on the Copernican metaphor. Parts III and IV contrast narrow, “Ptolemaic” accounts of health care competition with a “Copernican” array of interpretations and proposals that integrate antitrust doctrine with
a broader constellation of regulatory and self-regulatory processes. Using this
juxtaposition, we identify issues in health care antitrust where legal doctrine,
industry practice, and social preferences diverge, and we describe the contortions courts have used to reconcile them. Our analysis, which is still tentative, is
not intended to impose a “super-law” over current institutions. We have neither a deregulatory agenda nor a belief that regulators’ noses should be under
the competitive tent. We desire only to better define the interface between
competition and regulation in health care, and thereby to liberate legal and
regulatory actors to consider a wider range of issues than is their wont.
II
THE COPERNICAN METAPHOR
An abbreviated description of the Copernican revolution will suffice for
purposes of this article. Most of us remember from our years of general education that Nicholas Copernicus earned a prominent place in the history of science by resurrecting the speculation of some early Greek astronomers that the
earth and five known planets revolved around the sun. Unlike his ancient
predecessors, however, Copernicus backed his (relatively) simple heliocentric
hypothesis with precise calculations that produced highly accurate predictions.
The result was to demolish a millennium-old account of the universe—
associated with Aristotle and the Greek astronomer Ptolemy—that had placed
the sun and planets in orbit around the earth. This outcome was all the more
controversial because the centrality of earth in the Ptolemaic cosmology had
been adopted as gospel for the exaltation of man in Christian belief generally
and Catholic dogma specifically. Further, Copernicus’ revelation begat even
more revolutionary theories by Kepler, Galileo, Bruno, and, eventually,
Einstein.
Renaissance astronomy is the epitome of dictum as applied to antitrust law.
Several aspects of the seismic shift in scientific thought triggered by Copernicus
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are relevant, however, to our case for adopting a dramatically different perspective on health care competition beyond the basic metaphor of abandoning an
exclusively physician-centered view of the health care system. First, the
Ptolemaic version of events prevailed for nearly two millennia because it was
both plausible and serviceable. Its reign came to an end only because of technical improvements in the ability to measure celestial phenomena and parallel
growth in applications for such measurement that demanded still greater precision. Neither can one accurately view its demise as a burst balloon; rather, the
Ptolemaic model collapsed under its own weight.15 Analogously, advances in
both medical care and econometrics over the past half-century have placed
greater demands on antitrust policy to generate competition not only on price
and output, but also on linear quality, choice, and innovation, and have highlighted the absence of a workable model for evaluating these price-quality and
quality-quality tradeoffs. Similarly, the expansion of public funding for health
care and the social consequences of restricted access to insurance or services
have not been incorporated logically into competition policy, though they indisputably influence the evolution of medical markets.
Second, Copernicus (and his publicists) took great pains to avoid a direct
confrontation with the defenders of the Ptolemaic creed. On the Revolutions
was not published until the year of Copernicus’ death.16 The author’s preface,
addressed to then-Pope Paul III, did not deny the work’s iconoclasm but confined it to science rather than religion or politics.17 Antitrust law has analogous
orthodoxies. The influence of interpretations based on democratic theory,
public choice, and the like has receded in recent years, leaving the field to the
harsh economics of marginal cost pricing and consumer surplus. Consequently,
attempts to incorporate hard-to-monetize constructs such as quality and innovation into antitrust doctrine might be viewed by market supremacists as heretical.

15. As observation improved, the Ptolemaic model required increasing complexity for accurate
prediction, including ways that challenged common sense such as epicycles (circular suborbits whose
centers are carried around the body being orbited), which were hypothesized to account for the
apparent retrograde motion of the planets when seen from earth; eccentrics (circular orbits not
centered on the body being orbited); and equants (circular orbits around which planets or the centers of
epicycles move uniformly), which were hypothesized to account for apparent changes in planetary
velocity. See generally ALEXANDRE KOYRE, THE ASTRONOMICAL REVOLUTION: COPERNICUSKEPLER-BORELLI (1973) (discussing the shift from Ptolemaic to Copernican theories of the universe).
16. It is said that galleys were delivered to him on his deathbed, a work ethic to which all
academics might aspire. The essence of Copernicus’ heliocentrism was evident in an earlier work,
Commentaries, which was probably written in 1512, but did not gain wide circulation. Id. at 25-28.
17. Copernicus wrote to His Holiness that “astronomy is written for astronomers,” COPERNICUS,
supra note 1, at 5, and qualified the self-promotional epigraph that begins this article with the warning,
“Let no one untrained in geometry enter here.” Id. at XV. Andreas Osiander, a Copernican apologist
who penned the foreword to the first edition of On the Revolutions, went farther still, asserting that the
heliocentric theory was merely a predictive shorthand, not a claim to scientific truth: “For these
hypotheses need not be true nor even probable. On the contrary, if they provide a calculus consistent
with the observations, that alone is enough.” Id. The Pope appears to have been placated, but other
religious figures, John Calvin among them, may not have been. See EDWARD ROSEN, COPERNICUS
AND HIS SUCCESSORS 161-72 (1995) (discussing the historical validity of various anti-Copernican
statements attributed to John Calvin).
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Not to be disingenuous, any approach that allows regulatory modifications of
supposedly free competition indeed risks reintroducing through a quasi-economic back door softer “social considerations” no longer welcome at the front
entrance.18 On the other hand, the Copernican disclaimer seems warranted to
the extent that courts (and even regulators) apply the lessons of a more
nuanced competition policy carefully to specific cases and controversies, rather
than indulging in sweeping pronouncements about the social costs and benefits
of marketplace activities.
Third, a beneficial side-effect of Copernican heliocentrism was to put earth
on the same footing as the other planets, avoiding the need to model its behavior as a special case that cannot be informed by observation of non-terrestrial
bodies. The debate over whether health care is different from other goods and
services traded in markets has occupied countless commentators of all philosophical bents for several decades.19 The post-Goldfarb application of antitrust
oversight to health care intensified controversy rather than resolving it, much as
one can imagine the theories of Copernicus (or, indeed, Darwin) threatening
existing hierarchies of social authority and perceived self-importance. Refining
competition theory to account for nonprice concerns, including societal as well
as consumerist perspectives, might help reconcile these perspectives by allowing
health care to be analyzed on a par with other regulated and recently deregulated industries. If one can identify universal attributes of quality or social welfare that can be factored into competitive analysis, the uniqueness of health
care truly becomes moot for antitrust purposes.
Fourth, in some ways, Copernican theory was more, rather than less, difficult for an astronomical observer on earth to employ because its predictions
were based on a frame of reference (the sun) that was not the observer’s. Competitive models of health care centered on consumers rather than physicians
suffer from analogous disadvantages because professional opinion tends to be
much more accessible than direct empirical measurements of market preferences. Expanding health care antitrust analysis to capture a broader range of
issues and objectives than price-output competition may further complicate the
task of judging. Regardless of the elegance of any such theory, the judicial
frame of reference is defined by the parties to a given dispute, for whom traditional economic-analytic tools may be preferable to a “meta-picture” of competition policy. Moreover, whereas Copernicus could admonish those untrained
18. One bridge between Ptolemaic and Copernican world-views in this respect is the extreme
version of Chicago School antitrust economics, which maintains that markets function so well if left to
their own devices that antitrust enforcement only becomes necessary when government itself has done
something to interfere with market forces. This argument provides a theoretical justification for
coordinating antitrust enforcement with substantive oversight in regulated industries. See generally
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978) (expounding
the Chicago School view).
19. Compare, e.g., THOMAS RICE, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED (1998)
(criticizing the belief that market competition yields better public policy outcomes in health care than
government control) with RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO
HEALTH CARE? (1997) (criticizing government efforts to expand access to health care).
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in geometry not to enter the province of astronomy, the antitrust courthouse
door is open to all levels of economic sophistication (or lack thereof).
Finally, Copernicus was wrong. It took Johannes Kepler to recognize that
planetary orbits were not circular but elliptical, with the sun lying at one focus.
By suggesting that price-output analysis represents an incomplete and misguided model of health care competition, we are therefore placing ourselves in
Kepler’s shoes as much as those of Copernicus. The genesis of Copernicus’
error is as interesting as the fact of its occurrence. Copernicus intended his
theory to confirm the “natural perfection” of circles and spheres, not merely to
demonstrate the superiority of a heliocentric model for the solar system.20
Ironically, this preoccupation forced him to reintroduce epicycles and eccentrics
to his model even though they marred its attractiveness by increasing the
number of calculations required to predict planetary positions. It is therefore
worth asking ourselves whether we cherish analogous beliefs that could simultaneously inspire and sabotage our project. We certainly believe that access to
health care has social importance, whatever its competitive significance. Relatedly, we also believe that medical professionalism is not merely an empty
vessel. Whether these commitments, or other tacit biases, taint our conclusions
is a matter for both introspection and external review.
III
“PTOLEMAIC” COMPETITION
Like astronomical models, conceptions of health policy are ultimately
grounded in efforts to reconcile observed facts about ourselves and the world
with our intuitions and aspirations. Part of this process is inductive, part deductive. Just as ancient astronomy was intertwined with cosmology, modern health
policy is connected to deeply held beliefs. Different civilizations grouped the
same stars into different constellations with different meanings. Analogously,
some countries construct universal health care systems centered on the state
while others, such as the United States, accept the pluralism and happenstance
of private actors transacting in private markets, albeit with substantial public
participation and subsidy. Yet underlying all health care systems are qualitatively similar problems, resources, and objectives. The remainder of this article
will describe the way in which antitrust law has evolved an understanding of the
relationship between America’s unique health care system and these convergent considerations. This section outlines the view of competition that by and
large has characterized medical antitrust policy, which this article deems
“Ptolemaic.” Part IV, which explores the “Copernican” vision, goes beyond the
limits of current antitrust policy to account for production-side technological
and organizational capabilities and certain collective preferences as well as
demand-side market interactions.

20. See ROSEN, supra note 17, at 117-26.

SAGE_FMT.DOC

10/02/02 1:49 PM

Page 241: Autumn 2002]A COPERNICAN VIEW OF HEALTH CARE ANTITRUST

249

Historically, antitrust law’s treatment of medicine and the other “learned
professions” is a story of partition. For courts at least, the professions seemingly operated in a separate sphere, apart from the workings of trade and commerce.21 American Medical Association v. United States22 is an important exception, but one that also tends to confirm courts’ reluctance to treat professions
like other businesses. The criminal case brought against the American Medical
Association and the Medical Society of the District of Columbia for their systematic campaign to undermine the Washington, D.C.-based prepaid Group
Health Plan was aggressive even by today’s standards. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court upheld the convictions. In doing so, however, the Court carefully avoided the question whether the medical profession itself was engaged in
“trade,” focusing rather on the business aspects of the Group Health Plan that
were alleged to have been restrained. Consequently, the successful prosecutions in American Medical Ass’n did not immediately bring medical or professional conduct more closely in line with behavior expected in other lines of
commerce.
The medical profession came before the Court again in 1953, in a case similarly alleging anti-competitive conduct directed against prepaid health care. In
United States v. Oregon Medical Society,23 however, the Court reverted to a
policy of walled-off exclusion. To exercise antitrust jurisdiction over the
Oregon State Medical Society Plan required proof of an effect on interstate
commerce, and the Court found none.24 Though the Court affirmed the dismissal of the government’s complaint on the narrow grounds that the district
court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous, the opinion illustrates the
Court’s continued reluctance to view medicine as a business. Noting that “there
are ethical considerations where the historic direct relationship between patient
and physician are involved which are quite different than the usual considerations prevailing in ordinary commercial matters,”25 the Court suggested that
agreements not to compete between non-profit organizations might be treated
deferentially, and contended further that there was no reason to expect compe-

21. See, e.g., FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931) (“medical practitioners . . . follow a
profession and not a trade”).
22. 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
23. 343 U.S. 326 (1953). The conduct in Oregon Medical Society differed from that in American
Medical Ass’n. Between 1936 and 1941, the Medical Society engaged in a scorched-earth policy against
the growth of prepaid plans very similar to the conduct condemned in American Medical Ass’n. See
United States v. AMA, 110 F.2d 703, 705-07 (D.C. Cir. 1940). In 1941, however, the Medical Society
shifted tactics and started its own non-profit prepaid plan to compete against the private for-profit
alternatives. Consequently, the government’s complaint alleged an effort to monopolize the market for
prepaid plans, and further challenged a practice where the State Medical Society agreed not to compete
against prepaid plans sponsored by County Medical Societies. Oregon Med. Soc., 343 U.S. at 328-30.
24. Oregon Med. Soc., 343 U.S. at 339. Efforts to classify health care as an intrastate concern
played almost as important a role in shielding medicine from antitrust scrutiny as did the assertion that
the professions were not engaged in trade or commerce. See Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S.
322, 333-43 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that peer review procedures involving a single
department of a Los Angeles hospital did not trigger Sherman Act jurisdiction).
25. Oregon Med. Soc., 343 U.S. at 336.
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tition between prepaid insurance plans to yield meaningful economic benefits.26
The Court weakly distinguished its earlier decision in American Medical Asso’n,
reasoning that the location of the Group Health Plan in Washington, D.C., had
automatically subjected it to federal law enforcement.27
The Supreme Court did not revisit the issue until 1975, when it ruled in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar that lawyers could not set fees collectively for
representing homebuyers and sellers.28 Coming more than three decades after
American Medical Ass’n and involving law rather than medicine, the decision
rejected the notion that lay purchasers of professional services were incapable
of evaluating price-quality tradeoffs, and thereby signaled a new era in antitrust
enforcement against the learned professions.29 A stream of cases followed, substantially draining the professions and professionalism of their historical mystique. The first line of the Court’s 1986 opinion in FTC v. Indiana Federation of
Dentists illustrates the radical transformation in judicial thinking that had
occurred: “This case concerns commercial relations among certain Indiana dentists, their patients and the patients’ dental health insurers.”30 The business of
health care was now, in fact, business. To be sure, Goldfarb’s famously
ambivalent “footnote 17” reminded readers that the Court had entered
uncharted territory and might at some point retreat to a position of deference to
collective professional judgment,31 but none of the subsequent cases gave any
indication that judicial lip service to professionalism had substantive meaning.
Rather, the suggestion that professional concerns might justify a uniquely tailored set of antitrust principles was repeatedly marginalized.32

26. Id. at 337-38 (“There is not the least proof that duplicating sources of the prepaid certificates
would make them cheaper, more available or would result in an improved service or have any
beneficial effect on anybody.”).
27. Id. at 339 (“Interstate commerce was not necessary to the application of the statute there.”).
28. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In addition to rejecting the argument that the learned professions were
not engaged in trade and commerce, the Court rejected claims that the price-fixing agreement did not
affect interstate commerce and that it was immune under the state action doctrine. Id. at 786-92.
29. Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care as a (Big) Business: The Antitrust Response, 26 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 939, 940-43 (2001) (describing the seminal role the Goldfarb decision played in
opening up the medical profession to antitrust scrutiny and in permitting managed care to take root).
30. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 448 (1986) (emphasis added).
31. Footnote 17 reads:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is, of
course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It
would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business
activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in
other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that
a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any other situation than the
one with which we are confronted today.
Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788 n.17.
32. See Thomas E. Kauper, The Role of Quality of Health Care Considerations in Antitrust
Analysis, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 281-92 (Spring 1988) (tracing the treatment of footnote 17
from Goldfarb through Indiana Federation), and concluding that professional concerns are only given
special consideration to the extent that they affect the appropriate economic analysis of the alleged
restraint).
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These early efforts to apply antitrust law to professional markets generated
considerable confusion in terms of antitrust doctrine. For example, it is hard to
say whether the Court was employing per se analysis, rule of reason analysis, or
what ultimately came to be known as “quick look” rule of reason analysis.33
Regardless of the label, however, the conduct challenged in these cases—mainly
price-fixing and concerted refusals to deal—fell close to the core of traditional
antitrust liability.34 Applied to such behavior, the message was clear: Decisions
that had previously been left to professional discretion would now be subject to
market discipline and judicial scrutiny. From a policy perspective, this generation of antitrust enforcement was designed to break down long-standing professional resistance to market forces and to encourage price competition. In
health care specifically, antitrust enforcement helped new forms of medical and
insurance organizations gain access to patients and physicians, and facilitated
the emergence of active purchasing strategies such as selective contracting and
utilization review.
As managed care came to dominate American health care, however, new
facts emerged about the health care enterprise and about the organizations
managing it. Much as improved astronomical observation rendered the
Ptolemaic universe unwieldy and therefore suspect, so too did heightened
awareness of the realities of health care financing and delivery confound at least
three major assumptions that had governed traditional antitrust oversight:
(1) the central role physicians play in controlling medical markets, (2) the classification of payers as pro-competitive consumer agents, and (3) the belief that
price and quality competition will necessarily work in tandem.
A. Assumption 1: Physicians Run (Are) the System
Antitrust enforcement has assumed that health care is primarily about physicians. This preconception has both an intellectual and a practical heritage.
Physicians are undoubtedly the most powerful political force in health care and
are also the principal point of contact between the middle class and the health

33. In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), the Court condemned the
physicians’ maximum fee schedule as per se illegal price-fixing, but proceeded to give fairly detailed
rule-of-reason-type consideration to the physicians’ proffered justifications. In FTC v. Indiana
Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468
U.S. 85 (1984), and National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), the
Court purportedly claimed to be employing rule of reason analysis, but proceeded to condemn the
conduct in summary fashion, without giving substantial consideration to the alleged justifications. In
California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999), the Court attempted to clarify the role of “quick
look” analysis, although few would claim that the law is substantially more clear in the wake of the
Court’s opinion.
34. See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (collective refusal among dentists
to provide insurers x-rays that could be used in utilization review efforts); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (college agreement collectively allocating television
broadcast rights); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (collectively set
maximum fee schedule for physician services); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679 (1978) (ethical canon prohibiting competitive bidding for engineering services); Goldfarb v. Va.
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (bar association policy setting minimum prices for particular services).
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care system. Accordingly, early accounts of medical economics were iatro-centric, emphasizing physicians’ authority to determine the course of treatment for
patients and the potential for medical ethics to overcome information market
failure.35 With respect to the courts’ experience specifically, more than twothirds of the medical antitrust disputes decided between 1985 and 1999 involved
physicians’ relationships with hospitals.36
Perceived physician dominance has several implications for antitrust
enforcement involving quality. First, because physician-determined quality is
amenable to licensing, direct regulation, self-regulation, malpractice litigation,
and other influences apart from competition, antitrust courts arguably felt comfortable leaving such a complex subject to better-qualified governmental and
quasi-governmental processes. Second, physicians accustomed to unquestioned
authority tended to commit flagrant rather than subtle antitrust abuses, so that
the courts’ time was well spent dislodging these habits and opening medicine to
price competition. Third, most physician-initiated suits challenged hospitals’
exclusive contracting and staff-privilege decisions, seldom raised serious antitrust issues, and typically were dismissed in the early stages of litigation.37 As a
result, physicians were generally not perceived as credible antitrust plaintiffs,
even (perhaps especially) when claiming injury to quality.
These tendencies are well illustrated by the staff privileges cases, which
remain the most common type of medical antitrust litigation. Typically, a physician whose privilege to practice at a particular hospital has been denied, limited, or terminated by the existing medical staff of physicians claims an unlawful
boycott by competitors. In nearly all of these cases, courts regard the medical
staff’s action as quality-motivated and, therefore, a legitimate exercise of regulatory and self-regulatory prerogatives. When plaintiffs prevail, as they do in a
handful of instances, it is by showing that rivals’ personalities and pocketbooks,
not patients’ welfare, led to their injuries.38 Staff privileges disputes therefore
reinforced the perception among judges that antitrust law is an unlikely forum
for improving physician practice, and that physician quality is a regulatory concern distinct from market competition. The superficial resemblance of staff
privileges actions to state licensing decisions probably predisposed courts to this
approach. Both actions serve to truncate the quality curve so that physicians
practicing below a certain standard are unavailable to consumers as a market
option rather than offering lower quality at a potentially cheaper price.
Times, however, are changing. Hospitals are increasingly geared to satisfying insurer—not physician—demands, which shifts the basis of competition
from providing technology, capacity, and amenities to achieving consistent

35. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON.
REV. 941, 947, 965-66 (1963).
36. Hammer & Sage, supra note 7, at 566. The percentage was likely even higher before 1985.
37. Id. at 567-70, 574-78.
38. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) (upholding $2 million award in favor of surgeon
whose hospital privileges were terminated at the urging of his former partners).
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quality at lower prices.39 Our empirical study revealed a trend in the 1990s
toward greater “inter-brand” competition among hospitals, achieved in part by
entering into exclusive contracts with physicians to staff hospital departments.40
Unlike most staff privileges cases, which tend to partition competition from
quality, courts hearing exclusive contracting cases by and large have recognized
the importance of quality to hospitals’ competitive positions.41 Exclusive contracting cases, therefore, provide a more promising point of departure for constructing a Copernican framework for antitrust law.
Physician dominance of the health care system is being undermined by other
forces as well. Home health care and durable medical equipment have become
big business, drug companies are focusing less on physician detailing and more
on insurer formularies and direct-to-consumer advertising, pharmaceutical and
biotechnological innovation is accelerating, the dietary supplement market is
booming, and patients are broadening the care they seek to include a host of
alternative practitioners. What accounts for increases in the size and influence
of the nonphysician sectors? Surprisingly, the answer is mainly Medicare (and
to a lesser extent Medicaid), which opened a fire hydrant of public funding and
initiated a positive feedback loop of increasing economic and political power for
a host of corporate, institutional, and professional interests. Through effects on
health care costs mediated both by availability and use of medical technologies
and by cross-subsidization from privately insured patients, public insurance
programs bear responsibility as well for some of the dramatic power shift from
physicians to private insurers under managed care.
The degree to which the health care system revolves around physicians is
important not only to competition based on linear quality, but to the economic
and antitrust significance of “choice.” Although the medical profession’s “ethical” commitment to maintaining free choice of physician always had a dark
economic underbelly,42 this commitment combined with state regulatory mandates and federal reimbursement rules regarding hospital participation in insurance to make choice an inherent attribute of American health care rather than a

39. This trend is beginning to be recognized in other areas of health law as well. For example, the
Internal Revenue Service has relaxed its limitations regarding physician participation on boards of
trustees of tax-exempt hospitals and no longer automatically regards physicians as “insiders” when
scrutinizing such hospitals for private inurement.
40. Hammer & Sage, supra note 7, at 569, 580; see also Peter J. Hammer, How Doctors Became
Distributors: A Fabled Story of Vertical Relations, 14 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. (forthcoming 2002)
[hereinafter Hammer, How Doctors Became Distributors].
41. See, e.g., Martin v. Mem’l Hosp., 130 F.3d 1143, 1150 (5th Cir. 1997) (opining that exclusivity
improves quality control); White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820 F.2d 98, 105 (4th Cir. 1987)
(“[B]y making one group responsible and accountable to [the hospital], . . . it minimizes its malpractice
exposure, [and] can better monitor operations and quality control.”).
42. See Charles D. Weller, “Free Choice” as a Restraint of Trade in American Health Care Delivery
and Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1351 (1984) (identifying the anti-competitive effects of the AMA’s
“ethical” condemnation of limitations on choice of physician); see also PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 299-300 (1982) (describing the environment articulated
in 1934 by the AMA in which private insurance might “ethically” operate and noting that “[i]n the
name of free choice, it effectively eliminated the possibility of competition”).
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potential competitive dimension. Managed care brought choice back into the
competitive mix. Selective contracting initially was accepted as a legitimate
management strategy because of the potential to negotiate price reductions with
hospitals and physicians in exchange for assurances of patient volume (an essential linkage for demand-side models of medical competition). It was also
accepted because coordination of care, like utilization review, was thought to
offer quality improvements. By the mid-1990s, however, restrictions on choice
came to be seen as an obvious price-quality tradeoff, most dramatically through
the “Harry-and-Louise” lobbying campaign conducted by the insurance industry against the Clinton administration’s proposed Health Security Act. For this
reason, the economic boom of the late 1990s manifested itself in managed care
as a movement away from discrete, tightly integrated HMOs and toward broad
provider networks.43 Emphasizing choice of physician as a competitive benefit
is to some degree in tension with the notion of moving away from a physiciandefined health system, but it reinforces the idea that physicians are merely an
input to the health care product (albeit a critical one), not the product itself.
In the aggregate, this recalibration of the health care system away from
exclusive physician control raises two questions. One, how should antitrust law
adapt its quality-related approach to conduct by hospitals, insurers, pharmaceutical companies, and others who may differ from physicians in corporate form,
profit orientation, professionalism, and state regulatory supervision? Two,
should antitrust law be more open to physician claims regarding anti-competitive effects on quality now that the medical profession is less likely to be able to
abuse any power it is given?
B. Assumption 2: Purchaser Actions are Pro-Competitive
The traditional model of physician control described above located the
medical profession at the fulcrum of health system transactions, responsible for
providing or “ordering” all necessary goods and services for patients. By
default, this placed third-party payers such as insurance companies squarely on
the purchaser side of the procurement equation. Today, however, health care
purchasing is seldom done so simply. Rather, an array of intermediate parties—not only physicians, but insurers, employers, governmental entities, and
others—choose the services to be provided to patients and/or the price to be
paid for them. The degree to which this transition has been recognized by
courts has important economic and policy implications because, apart from
rarely enforced prohibitions against monopsony, antitrust laws operate in practice to restrain sellers, not buyers.

43. See Jon Gabel, Ten Ways HMOs Have Changed During the 1990s, HEALTH AFF., May/June
1997, at 134, 136-37. This phenomenon contains an aspect of linear quality competition as well. To the
extent that physicians participating in restrictive HMO panels were perceived to be inferior, offering a
broad network allowed managed care to claim that the best physicians would be available to
subscribers.
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In FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, for example, the Supreme Court
confronted the question of who should be entrusted to act as the consumer’s
surrogate.44 In assessing the competitive effects of the dentists’ collective refusal
to provide x-rays, the Court equated the demand of the insurer with that of the
individual health care consumer.45 To the Court’s credit, it recognized potential
problems of incentive incompatibility and probed the factual situation to satisfy
itself that treating insurers as patient agents was appropriate under the circumstances.46
Until recently, antitrust courts typically allowed health insurers to stand in
the shoes of individual patients and afforded them the deference antitrust law
traditionally extends to consumers of goods and services. Most courts tended to
assume the integrity of the agency relationship without analysis or concluded
that agency failures involving insurers are not an antitrust problem—at least not
one that physicians should be empowered to assert. When sitting on the First
Circuit, for example, then-Judge Breyer authored an opinion upholding insurer
surrogacy against a quality-based challenge by physicians. Kartell v. Blue Shield
involved Blue Shield’s ban on balance billing, a practice that required providers
to accept the insurer’s negotiated rate as payment in full—that is, not to seek
additional payment directly from patients.47 Plaintiff physicians argued that the
ban would chill innovation by preventing higher quality physicians from
receiving higher rates of compensation. The court rejected this argument,
holding that Blue Shield was empowered to act on behalf of its customers and
could be trusted to make appropriate price-quality tradeoffs.48
Kartell went beyond Indiana Federation. Even though the court in Kartell
assumed for the purpose of argument that Blue Shield possessed monopsony
power vis-a-vis physicians, it proceeded to extend to Blue Shield the full latitude antitrust laws extend to “buyers,” without addressing what implications the
insurer’s market power might have in the triangular relationship among
patients, providers, and payers.49 The opinion states:
44. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
45. Id. at 457 (“The fact remains that the dentists’ customers (that is, the patients and their
insurers) sought a particular service: cooperation with the insurers’ pretreatment review through the
forwarding of x-rays in conjunction with claims forms.”).
46. Id. at 463 (“Insurers deciding what level of care to pay for are not themselves the recipients of
those services, but it is by no means clear that they lack incentives to consider the welfare of the patient
as well as the minimization of costs.”).
47. Kartell v. Blue Shield, Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 924 (1st Cir. 1984).
48. Id. at 924 (“To find an unlawful restraint, one would have to look at Blue Shield as if it were a
‘third force,’ intervening in the market place in a manner that prevents willing buyers and sellers from
independently coming together to strike price/quality bargains . . . The persuasive power of the district
court’s analysis disappears, however, once one looks at Blue Shield, not as an inhibitory ‘third force,’
but as itself the purchaser of the doctors’ services.”); see also Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp.
Ins., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334 (7th Cir. 1986); Pa. Dental Ass’n v. Med. Serv. Ass’n, 632 F. Supp. 653, 671
(N.D. Pa. 1986).
49. Kartell, 749 F.2d at 926. Monopsony power in a particular buyer’s market need not imply
market power in the seller’s market. With Blue Shield, however, the same factors that would suggest
the existence of monopsony power for physician services would also indicate some level of market
power in the market for health insurance. By contrast, one can argue that a competitive insurance
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The short—and conclusive—answer to these arguments is that normally the choice of
what to seek to buy and what to offer to pay is the buyer’s. And, even if the buyer has
monopoly power, an antitrust court (which might, in appropriate circumstances,
restructure the market) will not interfere with the buyer’s (non-predatory) determina50
tion of price.

If recourse is to be had, the ruling continues, it is not to be found in litigation:
“A legitimate buyer is entitled to use its market power to keep prices down.
The claim that Blue Shield’s price scheme is ‘too rigid’ because it ignores qualitative differences among physicians is properly addressed to Blue Shield or to a
regulator, not to a court.”51
This assumption has come under increasing suspicion as the balance of
power between insurers and physicians has shifted. One reason the Supreme
Court gave in Indiana Federation for believing that insurers could be trusted to
act on behalf of consumers was the competitive nature of the insurance
market.52 The growth of managed care, and more importantly the consolidation
of certain geographic markets to include only a handful of health plans, has
reduced public confidence in the underlying competitiveness of insurance.53
Moreover, employers who sponsor coverage for their workforces either are not
considered effective advocates for individual consumers, or have come to be
seen as equally aggressive as insurers at cutting costs, particularly because selfinsured arrangements have proliferated in recent years.54 At the same time,
physicians ironically may now be more attractive to reviewing courts as consumer surrogates because they seem to be less economically powerful than in
earlier times.55

market was an important factor in the Supreme Court’s willingness in Indiana Federation to accept the
insurer as the consumer’s surrogate.
50. Id. at 929.
51. Id. Kartell really holds that physicians were the wrong plaintiffs to pursue such claims. An
antitrust action against insurance companies would still be available if the insurance market were not
behaving competitively. Furthermore, patients/consumers would be empowered to seek a broader
range of antitrust remedies against insurers than would contracting physicians (although they may not
have sufficient incentives to do so).
52. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986) (“[Insurers] are themselves in
competition for the patronage of the patients.”).
53. But see Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1411 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that there is a single, competitive market for health care financing, not a separate market for
HMO services that the defendant could monopolize).
54. It is still hotly contested whose money is in play when employers “give” their workers health
insurance. Economists agree that compensation paid in the form of health coverage is simply not paid
as cash wages, making it entirely the money of workers. However, many employers (and employees)
see it instead as an input cost to the business comparable to rent or raw materials. If employers make
decisions on that basis, however ill-informed, critics of employer surrogacy have a point. See MARK V.
PAULY, HEALTH BENEFITS AT WORK 15-35 (1997) (describing interviews with employers).
55. But cf. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1982). The Maricopa
decision can also be viewed through the lens of agency and distinguished from Indiana Federation on
that basis. The defendant, Maricopa County Medical Society, prepared a fee schedule that individual
physician members agreed to accept as maximum compensation for services provided to Societyapproved insurance plans. The Court observed: “Even if a fee schedule is therefore desirable, it is not
necessary that the doctors do the price fixing.” Id. at 352.
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A clear indication of this change is the treatment of most-favored-customer
clauses in contracts between insurers and providers, which have come to be
seen as surreptitious strategies by powerful insurers to foreclose competition in
the insurance market, rather than as straightforward attempts to obtain lower
prices for consumers. In Ocean State Physicians Health Plan v. Blue Cross,56
decided in 1989, the First Circuit confidently regarded a most-favored-customer
clause imposed on physicians by a health plan as beneficial to consumers,
extending Kartell to hold that “a health insurer . . . like Blue Shield must be
viewed ‘as itself the purchaser of the doctors’ services.’”57 By the mid-1990s,
however, the First Circuit had become more skeptical about most-favored-customer clauses. In United States v. Delta Dental of Rhode Island,58 the court recognized that such a provision could be regarded as unlawful on two theories.
First, although nominally put in place vertically by an insurer, the clauses might
in fact serve to police a horizontal price-fixing cartel at the provider level.59
Second, and of greater concern to the court, the clauses might be used by an
incumbent insurer with market power to erect a barrier to market entry because
any provider considering offering a discount at the margin to a competing
insurer would be forced to discount all of its inframarginal units as well.60 Either
behavior would ultimately harm consumers.
C. Assumption 3: Price and Quality Competition Work in Tandem
The popular perception that competition through managed care threatens
quality directly challenges another assumption of conventional antitrust economics: that markets with active competition over price and output will also
compete effectively over quality. In defining antitrust liability, courts have
made a conscious effort to make health care markets look and function more
like other markets. Part of this agenda operates at an ideological level. Antitrust courts generally follow a paradigm where markets and competition are
trusted to ensure consumer welfare in holistic fashion, including hard-to-measure quality, as well as more easily verified price and output.61 In keeping with
this belief, medical antitrust cases demonstrate a tendency to evaluate all anti56. 883 F.2d 1101 (1st Cir. 1989).
57. Id. at 1111 (citing Kartell, 749 F.2d at 924) (emphasis added). The court even considered
irrelevant any inquiry into whether the cost savings obtained through the contractual provision at issue
would be passed on to consumers. Id. at 1111 n.11 (“In the present case, Ocean State alleges that Blue
Cross never actually passed along its savings to subscribers. But nothing turns on whether Blue Cross
in fact lowered its rates. The fact remains that achieving lower costs is a legitimate business
justification under the antitrust laws.”).
58. 943 F. Supp. 172 (D.R.I. 1996).
59. Id. at 177 n.5.
60. Id. at 177.
61. The microeconomic focus of contemporary antitrust doctrine tends to assess anti- and procompetitive effects predominantly in terms of implications for price and output, even when such simple
models seem forced or inappropriate given the facts of cases. In National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v.
Board of Regents, for example, the colleges’ collective allocation of television broadcast rights was
summarily condemned because it reduced the number of games that would be broadcast (output). 468
U.S. 85, 99, 101 (1984). In this process, quality as a dimension of competition is often marginalized.
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competitive conduct, even that clearly affecting quality, using simplistic
price/output rhetoric.62 Although many courts acknowledge quality as an independent dimension of competition,63 they usually assert without substantial economic support that increased price competition will be associated with
improved health care quality.64 In practice, this leads courts to assess the
conduct of medical professionals in light of behavior predicted of market actors
in traditional economic models. In FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, for
example, the collective refusal of dentists to provide copies of x-rays demanded
by third-party payers was judged against a benchmark consisting of conduct the
Court would expect of individually rational businesses in a competitive environment. Central to the Court’s condemnation of the dentists’ practice was the
FTC’s finding that, absent the collective agreement, individual dentists making
independent decisions would have succumbed to market forces and complied
with the x-ray demands of third party payers.65
The tendency of courts to believe that price competition would serve quality
objectives equally well arguably was exaggerated by the odd history of nonprice
competition in health care. The poster child for efficiency gains in medical
markets—usually raised in the hospital merger context—has long been the
elimination of redundant technology purchased by facilities during less competitive times as part of a “medical arms race.” The Cold War image was intended
to suggest that competition on technology, though clearly a component of quality, was not really competition but social perversion. This suggestion was reinforced by popular belief in the 1970s and 1980s that physicians, who were still
paid on a generous fee-for-service basis, performed so many unnecessary procedures that true quality would improve if less were done to patients. It was a
62. In Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, for example, Judge Posner explained the theory under
which the Clayton Act condemned hospital mergers that would create high levels of concentration:
The reduction in the number of competitors is significant in assessing the competitive vitality
of the Chattanooga hospital market . . . [B]oth the ability of the remaining firms to expand
their output should the big four reduce their own output in order to raise the market price
(and, by expanding, to offset the leading firms’ restriction of their own output) and the ability
of outsiders to come in and build completely new hospitals are reduced by Tennessee’s
certificate-of-need law.
807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986) at 1387. In Ball Memorial Hospital v. Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc.,
Judge Easterbrook, a fellow Chicago Schooler, described the meaning and implications of hospital
market power in the following manner:
[The Hospitals] claim that the Blues have (and abused) ‘market power,’ the ability to raise
price significantly higher than the competitive level by restricting output . . . the Blues do not
have the power to restrict output in the market or to raise price because they furnish a
fungible product that other people can and do supply easily.
Id. at 1331 (citations omitted).
63. See, e.g., Sokol v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., No. 5:95CV1108, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22078, at
*29 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 1997) (“An antitrust plaintiff must show that challenged conduct affected the
price, quality or output of medical services available to consumers in the relevant market.”). In Sokol,
the plaintiff claimed an anti-competitive effect with respect to both the price and quality of cardiac
care. Id. at *6.
64. See, e.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 599 (1st Cir. 1993)
(“Competition remains an essential force in controlling costs and improving quality in health care.”).
65. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 452 (1985).
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small, if illogical, step to conclude that hospitals that proposed to merge in
order to become better competitors would offer both lower prices (because of
their lower costs) and higher quality.66
Not surprisingly, this assumption changed as managed care proliferated,
physician influence declined, and price competition increased. Fear of poor
quality due to service under-use quickly replaced fear of over-use, all the more
so because for-profit corporations struck the public (probably incorrectly) as
more likely to succeed in their cost-cutting strategies than physicians and nonprofit hospitals had been as “output maximizers.” Although these fears may be
overblown, quality did suffer in some respects as price competition improved.
In particular, transitional dislocations and poorly calibrated adaptations by
financially stressed providers took a toll. Moreover, price competition in health
insurance markets is often based on risk, not actual care.67 Indiana Federation
appears almost quaint in hindsight because of its assumption that reviewing
dental films would improve both price and quality by avoiding unnecessary
care. A similar case arising today would almost certainly be understood as
more about price-quality tradeoffs and less about eliminating waste.68
In sum, these observations suggest that the application of antitrust law to
health care, although potentially “Copernican” in its newfound willingness to
scrutinize professional practices for economic harm to consumers, has remained
mired in quite “Ptolemaic” assumptions about the centrality of physicians.
Although one can view Goldfarb and similar cases as echoing growing social
distrust of government and professional elites in the immediate post-Vietnam,
post-Watergate era,69 medical antitrust law arguably has been directed primarily

66. It was particularly illogical because high output, a supposed indicator of effective competition,
itself became suspect as a competitive phenomenon. The alternative story, and in our opinion the
better one, is that public and private reimbursement practices during that era kept hospital prices
artificially high. As is typical in price-supported industries, some of the surplus was kept as additional
profit, but much was dissipated in competition to provide non-price benefits to consumers. The reason
that technology was so often the medium of such competition is a simple one: Physicians (not insurers
or the patients themselves) determined where patients were admitted and so were the “consumers”
hospitals were competing to serve. Physicians found it more convenient to work in (and, therefore,
admit their patients to) hospitals that had all the latest technology.
67. See Wynand P.M.M. Van De Ven & Randall P. Ellis, Risk Adjustment in Competitive Health
Plan Markets, in 1A HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 755, 771-76 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P.
Newhouse eds., 2000) (explaining selection in health insurance markets); cf. Patricia Neuman et al.,
Marketing HMOs to Medicare Beneficiaries, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 1998, at 132 (concluding that
HMOs market selectively to healthy seniors).
68. Similarly, a point made in passing by the Court to the effect that the dentists’ collusion
“reduced output” by not providing the x-rays could be interpreted rather differently today. The
physical x-ray is not an additional unit of output itself, but the information it embodies has independent
value to consumers. The markets for information and for the underlying product or service are distinct.
See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 776-77 (1999) (noting that “the relevant output for antitrust
purposes here is presumably not information or advertising, but dental services themselves”).
69. From this perspective, the application of antitrust law to the professions parallels recent antiestablishment social movements such as environmentalism, feminism, and consumerism. See Marc A.
Rodwin, Patient Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons from Medical Consumerism and the
Patients’ Rights, Women’s Health and Disability Rights Movements, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 147 (1994). It
also evokes earlier populist reactions against professional dominance, such as the widespread repeal of
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at serving the narrow cost-containment objectives of corporate purchasers.
Managed care itself, though nurtured by the social agenda of the 1960s and the
notion of “health maintenance” as a preventive, cooperative alternative to the
paternalism of private practice medicine, similarly was co-opted by the economic agenda of the 1970s—oil shocks, stagflation, and rapidly growing worker
and retiree health costs in rust-belt industries. Consequently, medical antitrust
law has focused less on promoting “consumer sovereignty” per se than on generating price competition while still relying on physician control to maintain
quality at acceptable levels.
IV
TOWARD A “COPERNICAN” THEORY
Having set forth the observational basis for a “Copernican” reformation of
health care policy, we are now poised to outline its main elements. Some of
these are well recognized in the scholarly literature and have even been incorporated fitfully into legal doctrine, while others are our suggestions for “Keplerian” refinements of nonprice competition in health care as it is presently
understood. Underlying a Copernican approach is the desire to construct an
integrated competition policy for health care markets, that recognizes its multicentric nature. Antitrust law constitutes only one planet in the night sky, representing a single, albeit quite important, set of tools available to policy-makers.
Therefore, a Copernican view requires both rethinking the application of antitrust principles in their traditional domain and revisualizing the relationship
between antitrust law and other forms of public and self-regulation—
connecting, for example, the federal government’s position as chief antitrust
enforcer to its role as the largest purchaser of health care services and the
driving force behind most technological innovation. The objective is to
cultivate an environment capable of generating not only effective levels of price
competition, but also appropriate trade-offs between price and quality, as well
as one able to accommodate other important social objectives, such as assuring
broad access to care.
A. Competition Policy at the Market-Regulatory Interface
A weakness of Ptolemaic antitrust law is its tendency to artificially segregate
private conduct from public conduct, separate market functions from government functions, and isolate quality as a professional or regulatory concern
rather than a competitive one. Traditional antitrust law has a bias in favor of
market-facilitating forms of intervention, and, as we will discuss shortly, a bias
against market-displacing interventions, even if this division is difficult to
rationalize from a strictly economic perspective.70 Furthermore, traditional antiprofessional licensing laws by Jacksonian Democrats in the 1820s and 1830s. See STARR, supra note 42,
at 55-59.
70. An antitrust standard framed in terms of enhancing competition can accommodate remedial
measures for market failure that are market-facilitating more easily than those that are market-
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trust analysis is prone to consider markets as autonomous realities rather than
as embedded in a broader social context and affected by a range of public policies and actions. Finally, antitrust law is apt to evaluate the desirability of private action in relation to a structural understanding of competition rather than
its likely effects on total social welfare. In varying degrees, a Copernican view
of antitrust challenges each of these strongly held assumptions.
From an economic perspective, whether competition will help or harm the
quality of health care depends upon whether increases in quality can be translated into increases in profits. There are at least four different ways that quality
and profits can be related. First are demand-side models in which increases in
provider-specific quality either increase the price that providers can charge or
the number of patients seeking services. Second, quality and profits can be
related through the provider’s production function. Given the degree of scientific uncertainty associated with many medical problems, organizational or
technological innovation can create profit opportunities through the introduction of new forms of treatment or new systems of providing care. Third, quality
and profits can be related, sometimes perversely, through various forms of risk
selection. The patient population that a provider attracts will depend, among
other things, on that provider’s perceived quality, with persons with greater
medical needs being disproportionately attracted to higher quality providers.
When the provision of medical services is combined with the sale of insurance,
therefore, profitability can be enhanced by attracting relatively lower risks, or
diminished by attracting relatively higher risks, a problem that increased choice
(though itself an attribute of quality) can exacerbate. Finally, certain forms of
competition can destroy value because of health care’s strong relational character. Specifically, medical trust may evaporate if consumers feel that health care
is nothing more than a series of marketplace decisions. This last consideration
is not as remote from marketplace processes as it may seem; trust and other
hard-to-quantify social factors are necessary for private markets to be viable
institutions in the first place.
Any set of antitrust (or regulatory) tools applied to health care markets
therefore must be robust enough to address the effects of a wide range of
market failures. Although market failures have been observed in health care
for decades,71 courts have not always taken them into account when performing

displacing. Market-facilitating remedies address imperfect markets by helping them operate more
effectively. The end result, however, is merely a market that looks and acts the way we think markets
ought to look and act. Information disclosure, certification, the collective bargaining for, and
monitoring of copyrighted works in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441
U.S. 1 (1979), and the rules prohibiting night trading in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918), can be thought of as market-facilitating measures. By contrast, market-displacing
measures work to counteract market failure through means and mechanisms that may be quite nonmarket in their appearance and operation, potentially sidestepping competition entirely to achieve
greater efficiency. Defining efficiency according to some form of total welfare standard would be
necessary to fully embrace market-displacing measures.
71. See Arrow, supra note 35 (discussing imperfections that impair the marketability of health
care).
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antitrust analysis. In Jefferson Parish Hospital v. Hyde,72 for example, the
Supreme Court required the plaintiffs to plead and prove the existence of
market power in order to establish a prima facie case of per se illegal tying, but
was unreceptive to the argument that market failures endemic to medical markets made it possible for parties to have and exercise “market power” with
market shares substantially lower than in other industries.73 Similarly, in Indiana Federation, the Court implicitly embraced a very optimistic set of beliefs
about the ability of health care markets to work effectively. The Court assessed
the legality of the dentists’ conduct in light of whether it was consistent with
individually rational behavior by competitors, not whether collective action
might improve market function.74 To be fair, the collective action at issue was
relatively easy to condemn, and the Court displayed sensitivity to at least one
type of market failure. In a market already plagued with information asymmetries, the dentists’ collective refusal to provide information specifically
demanded by sophisticated buyers was hardly likely to improve competition.
Significantly, the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in California Dental Ass’n
v. FTC,75 which upheld various collective restrictions on dental advertising
imposed by a professional association, expressly considered the legality of the
alleged restraint in light of market failures endemic in health care markets. Furthermore, the Court treated the extent of market failure and the competitive
effects of particular conduct as empirical questions.76 While the case signals
greater judicial sensitivity to market failure, including its nonprice consequences, it also suggests the dangers that such an inquiry might entail. Specifically, more nuanced market failure analysis can be used as a pretext to rationalize a variety of otherwise anti-competitive restraints. Indeed, for the first time
in decades, the Court cited Goldfarb’s footnote 17 in a manner that could plausibly be read to usher back the era of pre-Goldfarb professional control.77
We do not believe that this is the only or best reading of California Dental
Association. A return to professional dominance is not a necessary consequence of taking market failure seriously. The Court’s citation to Goldfarb’s
footnote 17 neither suggests that the professions are immune from antitrust
scrutiny, nor that different antitrust standards would be applied to their conduct.78 The opinion does reflect, however, the Court’s belief that professional
72. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
73. Specifically, the plaintiff noted that “the prevalence of third-party payment for health care
costs reduces price competition, and a lack of adequate information renders consumers unable to
evaluate the quality of the medical care provided by competing hospitals.” Id. at 27 (“While these
factors may generate ‘market power’ in some abstract sense, they do not generate the kind of market
power that justifies condemnation of tying.”).
74. Ind. Fed’n, 476 U.S. 447, 456.
75. 526 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1999).
76. Id. at 786-88.
77. Id. at 773 n.10 (quoting Goldfarb’s footnote 17).
78. The citation to Goldfarb’s footnote 17 came in the context of the Court’s discussion of
economic market failures. The sentence preceding the Court’s footnote citation is as follows: “The
restrictions on both discount and nondiscount advertising are, at least on their face, designed to avoid
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markets are associated with particular failures that should influence the economic, and hence, legal, evaluation of alleged restraints of trade.
We are certainly not the first to connect market failure to competition and
quality in health care. Indeed, as already noted, a “market failure defense” has
long been a staple of antitrust scholarship, both generally and as applied to
health care.79 Over a decade ago, Thomas Greaney systematically assessed the
potential for market failure analysis to enhance quality competition in health
care.80 Greaney reviewed a series of actual and potential failures afflicting
health care markets: information problems, seller heterogeneity and imperfect
mobility, monopoly practices, natural monopolies and externalities, public
goods, and insurance markets.81 He concluded that a narrow market failure
defense could benefit consumers by allowing physicians collectively to establish
quality standards and provide structured information to patients, but that courts
should exercise caution for fear of straying too far from the economic justifications for antitrust law and enmeshing themselves in situation-specific balancing
tests that could not be resolved on a principled basis.82
Our historical sense of the issues facing the health care system when Greaney wrote supports his prescription. Nonetheless, at the same time, there have
been significant shifts in the cause and nature of health care market failures
since Greaney’s contributions. In the late 1980s, competition of any kind in
health care was still a novelty, and physicians indisputably controlled both the
quality and cost of care. Accordingly, Greaney’s market failure proposal aimed
to encourage physicians to point out quality trade-offs inherent in price competition without permitting physicians to avoid both price and quality competition
by articulating quality concerns that would trump competitive considerations
entirely. In other words, the default position for the health care system was still
non-competitive, and the major reason to identify a narrow market failure
defense for quality-related conduct was to prevent quality from acting as a
brake on overall competition.
By contrast, today’s health care system is viciously price-competitive, and
both cost and quality are significantly influenced by parties other than physifalse or deceptive advertising in a market characterized by striking disparities between the information
available to the professional and the patient.” Id. at 772. Following the footnote, the Court cites a
number of scholarly works analyzing information market failures, including Akerlof’s seminal
contribution. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
79. See PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1504 (2000) (discussing market failure defenses
generally).
80. Greaney, Quality of Care, supra note 6 (endorsing a narrow market failure defense in health
care); see also Clark C. Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional
Relationships, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1095-96 (1984) (noting that market failures in health care create
limited opportunities for pro-competitive collective action); Clark C. Havighurst & Nancy M.P. King,
Private Credentialing of Health Care Personnel: An Antitrust Perspective (Part Two), 9 AM. J.L. &
MED. 263, 296-98 (1983) (same); Kauper, supra note 32 (discussing the effects of market failure).
81. See Greaney, Quality of Care, supra note 6, at 633-40.
82. Id. at 664-65.
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cians. Quality remains central to health care but, as our empirical study shows,
is often regarded non-competitively and therefore ignored by courts attempting
to oversee the competitive marketplace.83 In other words, the default position
for today’s health care market is price competition, and our purpose in discussing market failure is to validate quality explicitly as a competitive dimension
rather than merely a professional concern. Furthermore, a critical part of this
endeavor is to evaluate the role of non-physician actors in fostering or impeding
quality competition.
At the same time, the dramatic changes that have occurred in health care
markets over the past fifteen years should give us pause. Medical market failures are inconstant and multidimensional. To the extent that antitrust courts
have attempted to address market failures, it has been primarily in the limited
domain of imperfect information and the relatively safe confines of demandside models of competition. There is good reason to ask whether a more expansive view of antitrust law is simply an invitation for courts to sail rudderless on a
sea of doubt. There is no simple taxonomy categorizing the various market
failures plaguing health care markets or identifying their appropriate remedies.
Copernican analysis of medical market failure is likely to call for more complicated economic models and greater sensitivity to dynamic and not simply static
efficiency concerns.
Many of these tensions are illustrated by Clark Havighurst’s recent exposition of antitrust law’s impact on the market failures identified in Arrow’s seminal 1963 article on medical economics.84 Arrow’s principal thesis was that nonmarket institutions such as physicians’ ethical codes and non-profit hospitals
serve to fill “optimality gaps” that would otherwise cripple markets beset by
uncertainty and asymmetric information. Arrow’s analysis, however, is
ambiguous in an essential respect: He never specifies whether the activities of
these non-market institutions constitute primarily market or non-market
behavior.85 A potential explanation for this failure to specify roles is that Arrow
regarded the physician’s position in health care as far more central than it is
today, and perhaps even more central than was the case when his analysis was
published.86 One might speculate that Arrow hesitated to assign commercial
motivations to physicians because the mythos of physician virtue was so strong,
and its history so sustained. Alternatively, whether the “gap-filling” institutions
were predominantly market-facilitating or market-displacing may not have been

83. See Hammer & Sage, supra note 7, at 617-20.
84. See Havighurst, supra note 29.
85. Arrow, supra note 35, at 947 (“I am arguing here that in some circumstances other social
institutions will step in to the optimality gap.”); see also Peter J. Hammer, Arrow’s Analysis of Social
Institutions: Entering the Marketplace with Giving Hands?, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1081 (2001)
(discussing Arrow’s understanding of market and non-market institutions).
86. See Peter J. Hammer et al., Kenneth Arrow and the Changing Economics of Health Care: “Why
Arrow? Why Now?”, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 835, 844-45 (2001). For example, Arrow devotes
virtually no attention in his article to pharmaceuticals or to technologic innovation.
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as important a distinction to Arrow, an economist, as it would have been for an
antitrust scholar.
When the non-market institutions are, by accident or design, also market
participants, however, the distinction can be central for antitrust purposes.
Havighurst argues that professional activities that might otherwise be potential
restraints on trade should be evaluated under a “market failure” approach if
those interventions make markets work more smoothly.87 He is less sympathetic
to potential restraints of trade that displace, rather than simply facilitate,
market operation. Part of his concern is a legitimate fear that a variety of
worthy purposes might be invoked to justify market distortions, leading courts
to stray from the focus contemporary antitrust law maintains on strictly economic considerations. Another part of his concern reflects a traditional bias in
antitrust analysis toward assessing the effects, and therefore, the desirability, of
restraints in terms of their structural effects on competition. This bias tends to
foreclose a range of Arrovian market-displacing institutional responses to
market failures that may well be welfare-enhancing even in strict economic
terms.
A Copernican view would challenge these limitations with respect to market
failure. As opponents of managed care intuit, but rarely articulate with precision, a competitive health care system not dominated by the medical profession
may require special attention from government to safeguard values that were
previously protected through professional mechanisms that are no longer
viable. Accordingly, a Copernican approach would consider several collective
action problems in health care, including charity, improvements in medical
knowledge, and the maintenance of therapeutic trust, as potentially amenable
to incorporation into an integrated competition policy.
Another argument in favor of expanding the express purview of antitrust is
that, whether or not one espouses a Copernican view in theory, courts will not
be able to avoid more complicated forms of market failure analysis in practice.
For example, the market failure defense outlined in California Dental will force
courts to make detailed factual inquiries into the competitive implications of
self-regulatory activities.88 Because antitrust law generally condemns efforts by
private parties to use market power to define and enforce their own conception
of sound public policy,89 this will inevitably produce controversy—especially if
self-regulatory bodies are permitted to discipline violators rather than merely
deny voluntary accreditation or some other informational imprimatur. Among
other things, antitrust law will need to strengthen its ability to distinguish “real”
from “sham” self-regulation. Potential abuses can be curbed both through substantive criteria defining antitrust liability and prophylactic procedural
87. Havighurst, supra note 29, at 946-49.
88. Id. at 949-53.
89. See, e.g., Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941) (holding illegal a
collective refusal by dress manufacturers to deal with retailers that sold unauthorized copies). The case
most deferential to self-policing, Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, involved an implied statutory
exemption from antitrust liability conferred by the federal securities laws. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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requirements. In those instances where the exercise of private economic power
is not condemned outright, it can be “regulated” through common law antitrust
rules not substantially different from those used to ensure public due process,
transparency, and good governance in administrative procedure acts.90 This
analogy also suggests that antitrust law can have something constructive to say
about the competitive implications of explicitly governmental processes.
In addition to distinguishing between legitimate and pretextual market failure defenses, and adopting appropriate standards to police the conduct of
potentially market-displacing social institutions, antitrust courts must determine
what decision rule will guide their analysis. A fundamental question is whether
market failure is perceived as a problem of competition or of efficiency. In
conventional rule of reason analysis under the antitrust laws, the terms attached
to the judicial inquiry—”procompetitive effects,” “efficiencies,” “anti-competitive effects”—mix concepts that are intellectually distinct. Efficiency refers to
the maximization of social needs given social resources, and can be defined by
welfare economics in various ways. Competition refers to a set of industrial
structures and processes that favor active, informed bargaining between buyers
and sellers. The two notions sometimes converge in an empirical, microeconomic sense as the area between the demand and supply curves representing
consumer surplus, but they do not necessarily mean the same thing.
One’s answer to this question determines whether a market failure defense
should be limited to specific remedies for identifiable market imperfections,
such as lack of information or misaligned incentives between consumers and
purchasing intermediaries, or whether it extends to second-best justifications
for anti-competitive conduct in light of market failure.91 The latter approach
necessitates a total social welfare metric of efficiency, which sums consumer and
producer surplus rather than equating efficiency with consumer benefit, as is
conventional in antitrust analysis.92 With respect to quality, one can argue that a
legitimate market failure defense to an allegation of anti-competitive conduct
should demonstrate that consumers obtained better value (price per unit quality) than otherwise would have been the case. Because producers would not
engage in these activities unless they too benefited, one can regard a focus on
competition and consumer surplus in market failure analysis as fostering Pareto

90. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988) (discussing processoriented standards that would tend to make the actions of private standard-setting organizations
“procompetitive” under antitrust rule of reason analysis). But see Northwest Wholesale Stationers v.
Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293 (1985) (“[T]he antitrust laws do not themselves
impose on joint ventures a requirement of due process.”).
91. A classic example of this “two wrongs make a right” approach is the proposition that monopoly
power for health care providers is welfare-enhancing because the output restriction it theoretically
produces serves to counterbalance the moral hazard that leads insured consumers to overuse health
services. See Martin Gaynor et al., Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and
the Second Best in Health Care Markets, 108 J. POL. ECON. 992 (2000) (concluding that competitive
insurance markets would dissipate any such effect).
92. See Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the
Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849, 876-79 (2000).
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improvements that would be voluntarily embraced by all concerned. By contrast, a total social welfare criterion, standing alone, suggests Kaldor-Hicks efficiency analysis, which does not seem as well suited to governing voluntary
market transactions. Nonetheless, viewing market failure in health care
through a wider efficiency lens may have tremendous advantages in light of the
fact that a system no longer dominated by physicians may still have good reasons to pursue goals traditionally associated with medical ethics and medical
professionalism, some of which mainly affect individual “transactional” encounters between patients and the health care system, while others of which play
larger social roles. In this section of the article, we discuss market failures and
the Copernican health care system without binding ourselves to a position on
the general question of competition or efficiency.93 We consider the controversial implications of a total social welfare approach to market failure, which
involve the medical production function and the distribution as well as the allocation of medical services, in the last section of the article.
B. Traditional Market Failures and Copernican Competition Policy
What makes our approach to market failure deserving of the Copernican
metaphor? For one, we address the specific implications of power dispersion—
the physician-centered health care system becoming a multicentric system. Previous work on market failures and antitrust analysis in health care has emphasized the risk of perpetuating physician control, which is arguably no longer the
operative consideration. In addition, we take advantage of our shifting frame of
reference to examine the relationship between market failure and quality as a
coherent competitive limitation. We do not claim to provide a definitive
assessment of market failures in a Copernican setting, but rather intend our
analysis to elucidate a range of considerations that are relevant to such an
inquiry.
1. Agency.
A Copernican view of health care markets has its greatest impact on market
failure analysis in its understanding of how buyers and sellers transact their
business. The Ptolemaic interpretation of health care purchasing is dyadic: The
patient negotiates with the physician. Like its astronomical analogy, this interpretation has admitted various refinements. The modern patient is typically
armed with health insurance as well as cash. The physician no longer provides
most services directly, but procures (orders) them or refers the patient to other
physicians who can. The physician is also subject to various ethical and legal

93. More pragmatically, one can envision embracing different decision rules (competition versus
efficiency) based on the institutional competencies of the actors involved in setting competition policy.
This may argue in favor of a simpler competition-focused decision rule for courts evaluating potentially
market-facilitating behavior in antitrust cases, while channeling more complicated market-displacing
measures through legislative or administrative processes where a total welfare standard of efficiency
could be employed, or where the decision-maker might consider a broader range of non-economic
social objectives.
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constraints on exploitation and incompetence. Still, once one admits that the
transaction is economic and not altruistic in character, the patient is indisputably the buyer and the physician the seller. Under these assumptions, a market
failure defense in health care largely reduces to the question whether particular
collective activity or structural features tend to increase or decrease competition
among physicians for patients.
Viewing the health care system in multicentric terms requires a sharp departure from this analysis. Not only do many services that patients receive involve
sophisticated industrial or team production that belies the centrality of the physician’s role, but “purchasing” and “selling” have become functions of several
parties whose responsibilities with respect to patients interact with one another
in complicated ways. As Lawrence Casalino observes, principal-agent relationships in contemporary health care involve health plans, employer and public
sponsors, medical groups and network contracting organizations, private
accrediting bodies, and government regulators.94 These intermediaries did not
form overnight, but only recently has their activity become intense enough to be
unintelligible using a simplified, Ptolemaic approach to the competitive effects
of market failure.
Some low-hanging fruit relates to the role of hospitals in the production of
health care. Our empirical study revealed that physicians continue to bring
antitrust claims against hospital medical staffs that deny or restrict practice
privileges, notwithstanding very low plaintiff success rates and the existence of
explicit immunity under federal law.95 The salience of these suits depends to
some degree on the continued belief that the individual physician is the relevant
competitor, rather than conferring that designation on sellers of an assemblage
of professional and technical skills such as modern hospitals. If antitrust doctrine made it clearer that staff privileges determinations in today’s competitive
environment are presumed to be actions taken by hospitals specifically to
improve their ability to compete on quality against other hospitals, and not
actions taken by fellow physicians to protect quality in some vague professional
or social sense that might be perverted to anti-competitive ends, these cases
might finally go away, conserving valuable judicial resources.
Further evidence that antitrust courts are struggling to determine which
plaintiffs or defendants represent individual consumer interests (and, conversely, which are mere sellers) comes from cases involving the contracting
practices of health plans. The Ptolemaic premise of a dyadic market placed
insurers squarely on the buyer side of health care transactions and paid little
attention to ways in which their incentives and those of individual consumers
94. Lawrence Casalino, Managing Uncertainty: Intermediate Organizations as Triple Agents, 26 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1055, 1055-57 (2001).
95. Hammer & Sage, supra note 7, at 568-70 (showing that staff-privileges cases declined
significantly from 1985-1989 to 1995-1999 but constituted approximately one-third of medical antitrust
litigation even in the more recent time period); Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3784 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152) (2000) (granting antitrust
immunity to medical staff admission processes that meet certain standards).
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and patients might diverge.96 For antitrust purposes, physicians traditionally
were disempowered from questioning the actions of payers. Managed care may
lead courts to reassess this position to some degree, with physicians—long the
targets of antitrust enforcement—somewhat ironically being rehabilitated as
patients’ economic as well as clinical agents, while the claims of other parties as
putative consumer representatives are subjected to closer scrutiny.
This has not yet occurred. Ambroze v. Aetna Health Plans illustrates the
extension to managed care markets of the traditional designation of payers as
consumer-surrogates.97 In Ambroze, physician anesthesiologists challenged
aspects of their managed care contract that they argued interfered with their
ability to provide quality care to their patients, in essence asking the court to
decide, for antitrust purposes, who the proper agent was for the patient. The
court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument, reasoning that the managed care company was properly making price and quality decisions on behalf of patients.98
Courts that are more skeptical of managed care frequently engage in rhetoric
rather than detailed analysis of agency relationships. In Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, for example, Judge Posner expressed his doubts that
managed care mirrors patients’ preferences regarding quality in memorable but
imprecise terms: “[T]he HMO’s incentive is to keep you healthy if it can, but if
you get very sick . . . to let you die as quickly and cheaply as possible.”99 In FTC
v. Butterworth Health Corp., the court took a different approach, regarding
managed care organizations as preferential purchasers who spoke only for a
subset of potential customers in the market.100 To some extent, of course, antitrust law for procedural reasons is not well suited to perform discriminating
evaluations of “agency market failure.” Specifically, antitrust law makes it difficult to challenge actions by intermediaries because it imposes strict requirements of standing and antitrust injury on would-be plaintiffs, and limits damage
actions to those who purchased directly from the defendant.101

96. For example, when insurers contract for medical services on behalf of insureds, they may fail to
arrange for services that correspond to the preferences of the insureds, or they may act
opportunistically (stinting) at the time when services are called for under the contract.
97. No. 95 Civ. 6631, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7274 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1996).
98. The court held that the alignment of patient and payer interests should be left in the first
instance to the economic exchange between them, and if that market was incapable of safeguarding the
patient’s interest, then through recourse to regulators or legislators. Ambroze, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7274 at *21-22 (citing Kartell, 799 F.2d 922).
99. 65 F.3d 1406, 1410 (7th Cir. 1995).
100. 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1299 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (“Viewing the managed care discounts in light of
their impact on the welfare of consumers as a whole exposes them as illusory. Such selective price
advantages are hardly the sort of benefit the antitrust laws are designed to protect.”).
101. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY R. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST LAW
AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 38-56 (3d ed. 1998). At the same time, some courts have
demonstrated a willingness to think creatively about questions of standing in the context of managed
care contracting. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 606 (7th
Cir. 1997) (invoking an exception to Illinois Brick’s indirect purchaser bar where the complaint alleged
that the intermediate purchasers, wholesale drug middlemen, were also alleged conspirators); Rozema
v. Marshfield Clinic, 977 F. Supp. 1362, 1375 (W.D. Wis. 1997) (rejecting defendant’s argument that
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Furthermore, a Copernican perspective forces us to confront the possibility
that the question of which parties represent consumers is an incoherent one.
Historical convention and public policy instinct both tend to reinforce the perception that an individual with medical needs is the true consumer of health
care and that all other entities or groups exist to ensure that such an individual
can obtain care on competitive terms. It was easy to maintain this view when
insurers, employers, and government sponsors stood on the sidelines of markets
for medical services, but it is harder now that they are active players. Now, one
must ask whether purchasing is done not on behalf of individual patients but for
these organizations’ own accounts, or for collective interests that the organizations at some level serve. For example, ethicists and policy-makers continue to
debate the appropriateness of orienting physicians to serving “populations,”
such as the aggregate membership of a managed care plan, rather than individuals.102 Contractual and regulatory obligations will point to the real party in
interest much of the time, but many areas remain where the interpretation of
those duties is unsettled.103
On the other hand, sensitivity to the proliferation of intermediaries in managed care, and to the different roles that physicians now play, could help courts
assess the competitive implications of particular situations. Certainly, absent
evidence that insurers’ demands reflect the underlying preferences of consumers and therefore can be attributed to them as buyers, there seems no reason to
excuse the exercise of market power—either collusive or monopolistic—when
such demands are made. There even may be occasional instances where physicians undertake such strict patient advocacy responsibilities that they, rather
than insurers, should properly be regarded as buyers’ agents. In making these
determinations, antitrust courts will need to take account of the regulatory
environment as well as the details of contractual relationships. In addition,
improved awareness of agency failures might allow courts to reject antitrust
challenges to self-regulatory activities that reduce the cost of monitoring intermediaries, such as prohibitions on conflicts of interest involving employers and
insurers, or standards for making insurance coverage decisions.
2. Asymmetric Information.
It has become a truism that health care is beset by significant informational
asymmetries between physicians and patients.104 Informational failures deter
HMO subscribers were disqualified as plaintiffs because they were indirect purchasers of physician
services that were being “resold” through the HMO).
102. See, e.g., Jerome P. Kassirer, Managing Care: Should We Adopt a New Ethic?, 339 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 397, 397-98 (1998) (criticizing a population-based approach to medical ethics).
103. For example, the technical fact that fiduciary duties in employee benefit plans run to the plan
as a whole, not to individual beneficiaries, has yet to find clear application with respect to health
coverage under ERISA. See William M. Sage, UR Here: The Supreme Court’s Guide for Managed
Care, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2000, at 219, 221-22.
104. Many health care services are what economists call credence goods, meaning that consumers
cannot necessarily assess their quality even after consuming them. See Arrow, supra note 35, at 951-52
(identifying asymmetric information between physician and patient as the principal obstacle to market
functioning in health care). On the other hand, many markets function acceptably despite information
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both price and nonprice competition. As Justice Breyer stated in dissent to
California Dental Ass’n, for price competition to be effective, consumers must
be able to learn about lower prices and make purchasing decisions that reward
low-price providers.105 Similarly, effective quality competition requires identifying relevant differences along quality dimensions and credibly communicating
those differences to quality-sensitive buyers of health care services.106 Medical
antitrust law, however, traditionally viewed informational asymmetries as
unavoidable and intractable,107 and therefore regarded with suspicion assertions
by physician-sellers that seemingly anti-competitive conduct was merely an
attempt to improve consumer information.108
By contrast, a market failure analysis would approve pro-competitive efforts
to reduce information asymmetries, even if the mechanism for doing so
involved otherwise suspect collective activity.109 Conceptually, information
market failures are relatively easy to accommodate as a matter of antitrust doctrine. The fundamental heuristic is that additional information will make the
market operate more efficiently. Consequently, agreements that restrict the
type of information available to the market would be treated skeptically by
antitrust courts,110 while the law would stretch to permit forms of cooperation
that increased the quantity or quality of information available to the market,
such as accreditation and professional credentialing.

asymmetries, raising the possibility that it is society’s unwillingness to let people make their own
mistakes where health care is concerned, and not any special degree of consumer ignorance, that lies
behind various regulatory requirements. See James C. Robinson, The End of Asymmetric Information,
26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1045, 1046-49 (2001).
105. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 784 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Del. Health Care v. MCD Holding Co., 957 F. Supp. 535, 543 (D. Del. 1997).
Patients generally do not have the sort of information necessary to make informed judgments
about what medical procedures are appropriate, which hospital is best able to provide them,
or what they will cost. It is often difficult and expensive for them to search for this sort of
information, and they are unlikely to be in a position to evaluate the information they do
receive.
Id.
108. For example, the AMA justified its collective refusal to associate with “unscientific cultists”
(for example, chiropractors) on the grounds that a joint commitment to scientifically valid treatment
was necessary to assure consumers that physicians competing with one another could be trusted to offer
services of sufficient quality. See Wilk v. AMA, 895 F.2d 352, 361 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting this
argument).
109. Because self-regulation sits at the interface between public and private activity, it is worth
noting that potential antitrust liability for private parties can be matched by constitutional constraints
on limiting speech when public parties are involved. For example, a dispute over the constitutionality
of provisions in the FDA Modernization Act restricting tobacco advertising was recently decided by the
Supreme Court. Western States Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 238 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom.
Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 122 S. Ct. 1497 (2002) (holding that certain restrictions on drug
advertising contained in the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 violate the First
Amendment).
110. In this regard, for example, dentists’ refusal to provide x-ray support for their treatment
recommendations in Indiana Federation violates antitrust law because it represents a collective decision
among competitors to perpetuate informational asymmetry between buyers and sellers.
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Cases limiting information exchange supposedly to further competitive
objectives present closer questions. As recognized in California Dental Ass’n,
some information can be disruptive to markets.111 If information is unreliable,
unaided consumers may have a difficult time assessing competing quality
claims, creating the possibility that privately imposed restrictions on false or
misleading information could have pro-competitive effects.112 Nevertheless,
existing demand-side models provide a fairly workable framework in which to
assess the consequences of imperfect information and to predict the likely
effects of information-related restraints.
How does a Copernican view of health care alter this approach to information market failure? First, many of the parties that use information in a quasipurchasing role in a multicentric health care system are more sophisticated than
individual consumers. Employers, health plans, government payers, and the
like need far less protection from false or misleading information, so collective
efforts to restrict the flow of false information will rarely, if ever, enhance competition. This provides an explanation of the different results in Indiana Federation and California Dental Ass’n. In the former case, information (x-rays)
establishing the medical basis for dental work was requested by insurance companies with the ability and incentive to hire experts who could interpret it.113 By
contrast, California Dental Ass’n involved a situation in which Ptolemaic analysis led to an acceptable resolution: The information at issue in the case was
being provided mainly by solo-practice dentists serving individual patients on a
cash basis or in connection with relatively unmanaged dental insurance, and
therefore arguably had less competitive value than it presented risk of deception.114
Second, our empirical findings with respect to antitrust litigation suggest
that antitrust courts typically factor quality into the equation only in vague,
general terms. Quality measurement systems that have been developed by
health services researchers, and even those specifically designed to assist
employers’ selection of health plans for sponsorship, are still under-used.
Because it seems well within the capabilities of both institutional purchasers
and appropriately guided individual consumers to make use of this data, the
problem may be one either of buyer inertia or suboptimal design. A market
failure defense therefore should be particularly sensitive to sellers’ collective
efforts either to standardize or monitor the release of performance or outcome
data to consumers. Along the same lines, antitrust law should hesitate to

111. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 771 n.9 (“That false and misleading advertising has an
anticompetitive effect, as that term is customarily used, has been long established.”).
112. Id. at 775, 777-78.
113. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 455 (1986).
114. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 772 (citing Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A
Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328, 1330 (1979); B. FURROW ET AL., 1
HEALTH LAW § 3-1, 86 (1995) (describing the common view that “the lay public is incapable of
adequately evaluating the quality of medical services”).
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penalize competitors who can establish superior quality, as it can do inadvertently by considering them monopolistic markets unto themselves.115
Third, the increased diversity and sophistication of both purchaser and seller
institutions, and the proliferation of agency relationships among them, argue for
shifting away from minimum quality standards enforced through mandatory
licensure, and toward voluntary informational criteria. It is well-established
that licensing implicitly denies consumers a range of choices and alternatives
that might otherwise be available, often at lower prices.116 Licensing also has
serious limitations as a quality-control device. A one-time assurance of competence is of limited value when the underlying science and technology change
dramatically over the course of a medical career. Licenses are seldom revoked
or suspended, even in light of affirmative evidence of professional incompetence. Medical markets are reaching a level of maturity where a combination of
information strategies—accreditation, title protection (regulating the right to
use a title such as Dr.), certification, credentialing, and informed consumer
choice—can assume the lead in ensuring quality, while at the same time
improving efficiency in the technical provision of medical services.117
Fourth, the agency market failures referenced above suggest that information regarding agent competence and loyalty is more important in a Copernican
health care system than in its physician-centered predecessor.118 Compromised
agents have both psychic and pecuniary reasons for concealing conflicts of
interest, especially if collective restrictions on disclosure prevent “unraveling”
by keeping principal parties too ignorant of the risks to draw adverse inferences
from non-disclosure. For that reason, prohibitions on revealing conflicts of
interest, even for supposedly competitive (and therapeutic) objectives such as
maintaining trust, should bear a heavy burden of proof. An imperfect example
115. For example, the “anchor hospital” theory put forward by the government but rejected by the
district court in United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., would have put the defendant hospitals’
merger in jeopardy basically because the combined entity was significantly better than its local
competitors. 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). In Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, the
court accepted the characterization of the defendant medical clinic as so much better than the
alternatives as to constitute a separate market, but nonetheless excused it as a natural monopoly. 65
F.3d 1406, 1412 (7th Cir. 1995).
116. Cf. Arrow, supra note 35, at 953 (discussing professional licensure as limiting price-quality
tradeoffs in medical care, and proposing alternatives). In addition to these demand-side considerations,
licenses restrict entry and create significant rigidities in defining the production function for health care.
Moving away from licensing and toward information strategies will not only improve the functioning of
demand-driven incentives to provide appropriate levels of quality, it will also introduce incentives and
flexibility on the supply-side of medical services that could permit more rational substitution of inputs
and greater cost-effectiveness.
117. See William M. Sage & Linda H. Aiken, Regulating Interdisciplinary Practice, in REGULATION
OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 71 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 1997); Clark C. Havighurst & James F.
Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 NW. U. L.
REV. 6 (1975) (early work identifying the effect of Medicare’s program for reviewing the
appropriateness of medical care, and other quality-control standards such as professional licensure, on
the range of price-quality combinations available to patients).
118. See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health
Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1743-71 (1999) (discussing an “agency rationale” for mandatory
information disclosure laws in health care).
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would be gag clauses in managed care contracts, which prohibit physicians from
discussing treatments with patients that are not covered by health plans.119
Health plans could rationalize the practice as maintaining consumer confidence
in their product, and might even muster evidence that disparagement of health
plans by physicians is usually inaccurate and/or malicious. But any collective
restriction, or restriction by a plan with market power, should be closely scrutinized.
The merger of insurance with delivery of services in managed care systems
complicates informational asymmetries regarding quality. It is often in insurers’
financial interests to limit the number of individuals with severe medical needs
enrolled in their products. Somewhat counterintuitively, a reputation for quality in caring for certain diseases can therefore be disadvantageous to insurers,
who would prefer that such individuals go elsewhere. In managed care, insurers
frequently can exert control over quality information shared by their constituent providers, which was not the case in a Ptolemaic system. Adverse selection
issues can be even more problematic for hospitals and other providers paid a
fixed rate based on estimated group medical needs, who may have strong interests in maintaining high quality for their overall patient populations but also
may be concerned about attracting a disproportionate share of the sickest
patients. Antitrust law should take these issues into account when examining
collective informational activities involving managed care.
3. Choice and Standardization.
The foregoing point raises a series of issues with respect to consumer choice
in the marketplace. Because the medical profession long maintained that free
choice of physician was an essential “ethical” attribute of health care, choice
was taken for granted in Ptolemaic formulations of competition and certainly
was not linked to market failure. In our empirical sample, moreover, antitrust
courts were much more comfortable maintaining a reasonable degree of choice
in the market than evaluating linear quality claims of particular competitors,
possibly because overseeing consumer choice seemingly requires less technical
knowledge of medicine.
However, choice in a multicentric health care system implicates market failures relating to both agency and information, and presents problems of its own.
Because of the potential for adverse selection, choice can wreak havoc on
insurance markets if discriminatory pricing based on risk is not permitted or is
not possible. In addition to the point raised above regarding quality-related
information attracting risk, the tendency among private and public payers to
offer enrollees a choice of health plans can subject more expensive, higherquality options to adverse selection. Whether adverse selection is best

119. The example is imperfect because, although legislation prohibiting gag clauses is widespread,
there is little empirical evidence of their existence. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
(“GAO”), MANAGED CARE: EXPLICIT GAG CLAUSES NOT FOUND IN HMO CONTRACTS, BUT
PHYSICIAN CONCERNS REMAIN 2-3 (1997).
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addressed by direct regulation or by collective action involving insurers remains
to be determined. Still, antitrust law should be open to the possibility that
restricting choice in insurance markets to curtail adverse selection improves the
functioning of those markets and therefore improves competition in underlying
markets for health services.120
Choice is also relevant as it influences price-quality trade-offs. Outside of
commodities markets, product differentiation (often through advertising) may
shelter producers from price competition. One reason why price competition
was a latecomer to medical care is that each professional arguably offers a
unique service. Insurers achieved the same result by varying coverage in complex ways, so that price comparisons were harder for consumers to make. Standardizing product features can channel competition into price and linear quality.121 By the same token, standardized prices can facilitate comparison
shopping based on quality. Because contemporary health care markets are so
complex, situations may arise in which allowing every feature of health care
markets to vary according to consumer preferences actually reduces competition. This is not to say that antitrust courts should bless naked restraints on
trade, but only that they should be receptive to competent evidence regarding
pro-competitive effects under circumstances demonstrating lack of competition
in the absence of standardization.122
Finally, the movement of managed care away from restrictive panels of
“brand-name” providers and toward broad, overlapping networks—supposedly
the result of market preferences for extensive choice among physicians—may
really prove the opposite point, namely that choice is a false proxy for quality.
Managed care theorists have frequently hypothesized that an optimally competitive system would allow consumers to choose the degree to which their
health plans would incorporate cost considerations into treatment decisions,
sometimes called “economic informed consent.”123 Both patients and physicians

120. Antitrust law may also need to address issues of moral hazard, which can similarly impair the
effectiveness of insurance markets. In Smilecare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan, 858 F. Supp. 1035
(C.D. Cal. 1994), aff’d, 88 F. 3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996), for example, the court sensibly rejected a claim by a
seller of “supplemental insurance” that covered deductibles and co-payments under standard dental
insurance that dental insurers were refusing to accept its payments as fulfilling enrollees’ contractual
obligations, on the grounds that to do otherwise would have made it impossible for the dental insurers
to continue to provide their product.
121. For example, health reform proposals based on “managed competition” employed a standard
benefit package to promote price competition.
122. There is an obvious tension between this point and our earlier claim that health care markets
should move away from provider licensing and towards information-driven, consumer-selected
price/quality tradeoffs. How the tension between choice on the provider side and choice on the insurer
side of the market should be resolved is open to debate. For example, one wonders if market
competition (even with appropriate antitrust deference to welfare-enhancing forms of cooperation) is
capable of providing a defensible set of tradeoffs between choice and standardization, or whether this
type of problem is better suited for regulatory decision-making.
123. See, e.g., MARK HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, AND
ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 193-239 (1997) (discussing informed consent to rationing);
Arti Rai, Reflective Choice in Health Care: Using Information Technology to Present Allocation
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seem to strongly prefer a unitary standard of medical care, however, along with
modal forms of physician compensation (and hence, predictable, incentives
regarding under-treatment or over-treatment). Furthermore, exactly what the
health system offers consumers at the margin may be less important than consistency, so that tipping points likely exist from one equilibrium position to
another.124 (In some ways, this is merely a more elegant restatement of the
observation that adults tend to be most satisfied with their health plan when it
adheres to the style of medical care they experienced as children.) Consequently, patient trust and confidence, and hence, demand for insurance, might
be increased by restrictions on variation among plans and providers. If this
speculation is borne out by data, it becomes another complication of the
Copernican view that courts must from time to time confront.
4. Public Purchasing.
Part of the mythos of a physician-centric system is that American health care
owes its success to the rugged individualism of the medical profession.125 By
contrast, a principal insight of the Copernican view is that government plays a
constitutive—not merely regulatory—role in health care markets. This subsection considers the potential role of Medicare and other public payers in ameliorating market failures that impede private competition, particularly regarding
quality. The next section applies market failure analysis to regulation qua
regulation, specifically the immunity from antitrust scrutiny traditionally
extended to state action.
Public dollars comprise roughly half of the $1.3 trillion that the United
States spends annually on health care.126 Not surprisingly, it is widely recognized
that public purchasing (Medicare, Medicaid, Federal Employee Health Benefits) and other public funding—including federal tax expenditures—greatly
influence price-quality trade-offs in health care and the viability of particular
financing and delivery structures. Medicare in particular is the 800-pound
Options, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 387, 388 (1999) (discussing electronic technologies and consent to
rationing).
124. The present situation reflects an element of historical path-determinism. It suited a variety of
political interests for prepaid (HMO) care to be seen from the outset as an “alternative” system to feefor-service medicine, with opportunities for “dual choice.” See Gail B. Agrawal & Howard R. Veit,
Back to the Future: The Managed Care Revolution, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 30-33 (Autumn
2002).
125. Cf. James F. Lally, Letter, 279 JAMA 746, 746 (1998) (criticizing Uwe Reinhardt’s belief in
universal health insurance). Reinhardt’s reply explodes the myth:
Where are these rugged individualists? . . . Would I find them in the medical profession,
whose members rely so heavily on public subsidies for their education and the science they
apply, . . . who plead with government . . . to regulate managed care organizations . . . , and
who have never balked at using archaic licensure laws to protect their own economic turf?
Uwe E. Reinhardt, In Reply, 279 JAMA 746, 746 (1998).
126. Stephen Heffler et al., Health Spending Projections for 2001-2011: The Latest Outlook,
HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 207, 209-10 (projecting that 55.2% of 2003 health spending will be
private dollars). If one considers revenue forgone by the Treasury as a public expenditure, the nontaxable status of employer-sponsored health insurance increases the effective percentage of public
funding.
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gorilla of the health care system. Medicare’s coverage policies are often makeor-break for emerging technologies, and reimbursement rules frequently serve
as de facto licensing and scope of practice laws for various health professionals.
Although experts have long lamented the political forces that keep Medicare
from acting as a market participant,127 public payers continue to distance themselves from private market processes.128 Correspondingly, antitrust law has
indulged the belief that American health care is a private system governed by
private competition, even though public purchasing distorts prices, overbuilds
capacity (both physicians and facilities), and skews the development and dissemination of technology.
There is an historical irony here. Recall that Arrow’s early analysis of
health care markets invoked both medical professionalism and government
regulation as potential fillers of “optimality gaps” produced by uncertainty.129
As already noted, Arrow was ambiguous with respect to the market or nonmarket nature of medical ethics, but in 1963 he could safely assume that government was always a market outsider.130 By making government a (very large)
purchaser as well as a regulator, Medicare and Medicaid changed that, and created a persistent tension in health care oversight. For example, medical antitrust law developed largely in response to health care as “big business,” which
would not have been the case absent Medicare. One can even argue that
enforcement of antitrust law against medical professionals was in part intended
as a competitive solution to a cost problem largely of the government’s own
making.131
For Medicare and antitrust law to ignore one another seems foolish.
Instead, competition policy should pay close attention to the purchasing role of
government as a source of, or remedy for, private market failure. Some possible improvements are similar to activities already being undertaken by public
payers for their own purposes. For example, Medicare has the purchasing leverage and financial resources to obtain widespread participation by health care
127. According to one former Health Care Financing Administration Administrator:
Nothing is more frustrating, . . . nor more puzzling to outside observers, than the fact that the
payment methods—and even levels of payment—for so many things Medicare purchases are
written into law, often at prices higher than a big buyer such as Medicare could obtain in the
marketplace. . . . Medicare suppliers occupy a political territory of classic dimensions . . . :
narrowly focused interest groups with an enormous specific stake in issues about which the
rest of the body politic could really care less.
Bruce C. Vladeck, The Political Economy of Medicare, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 22, 22-30.
128. See Len M. Nichols & Robert D. Reischauer, Who Really Wants Price Competition in Medicare
Managed Care?, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2000, at 30 (analyzing Medicare’s abortive attempts to adopt
private purchasing strategies such as competitive bidding).
129. Arrow, supra note 35, at 947.
130. Medicare and Medicaid were enacted in 1965. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000).
131. See Havighurst, supra note 29, at 939-40. An interesting question is whether antitrust
enforcement became more important merely because health care providers accustomed to Medicare
were greedy, or because there was something about the way that government acted as purchaser that
increased anti-competitive rents in the private market. The latter conjecture lends support to the
Chicago School position that markets work pretty well without antitrust enforcement, unless
government itself has done something to impede competition.
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providers in systems for measuring and comparing quality, as well as to educate
consumers about how to use that information. Medicare could also use its own
information to generate designations of superior quality (“centers of excellence”) that would also be useful to private buyers. Similarly, Medicare could
invest in risk-adjustment techniques that would allow private employers to
counter adverse selection pressures when offering expanded choices to their
workers. Somewhat more speculatively, Medicare could be more self-aware
about the degree to which private insurers piggyback coverage decisions of new
technologies on Medicare’s local and national coverage policies. Or Medicare
could finally overcome political resistance to selective contracting for health
care services and force hospitals, and perhaps even physicians in certain specialties, to bid competitively while meeting specific quality standards, which would
provide extremely useful information to the private market.132
5. State Action.
A striking finding in our empirical review of antitrust litigation was the frequency with which defendants invoked immunity from liability, often on the
grounds that the conduct in question had been sanctioned by state government
in accordance with Parker v. Brown.133 Although there are important constitutional and prudential reasons for the federal government to respect state sovereign decisions regarding competition,134 the state action doctrine has from time
to time been criticized on economic grounds for its agnosticism toward the relationship between state regulation and market function.135
The state action doctrine is problematic to both Ptolemaic and Copernican
accounts of medical competition. Ptolemaic views base their discomfort with
sweeping state action protection on the observation that, particularly at the
state level, much regulation is either explicitly delegated to the medical profession or enacted with such deference to their views that it cannot properly be
regarded as democratic. To some degree, this is inevitable where the professions are concerned: Lack of independent state expertise means that nominally
132. Because they tend to be major employers in most communities, hospitals have been able to
exert sufficient political power to derail attempts by Medicare to experiment with competitive bidding
or other selective contracting models. Thus far, bidding has been successfully applied only to durable
medical equipment manufacturers, which lack equivalent demographic influence. See Bryan Dowd et
al., A Tale of Four Cities: Medicare Reform and Competitive Pricing, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2000, at
9, 24-25.
133. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See Hammer & Sage, supra note 7, at 581-82 (seventeen percent of
judicial opinions considered state action immunity). See generally SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note
101, at 90-103. Defendants also frequently claimed immunity under the political action (NoerrPennington) doctrine, the implications of which we discuss below. See infra notes 166-167 and
accompanying text.
134. For example, engaging the federal judiciary in determining the degree to which state regulation
impairs some theory of free market exchange bears a disturbing resemblance to substantive due process
review in the Lochner era. See James F. Blumstein & Terry Calvani, State Action as a Shield and a
Sword in a Medical Services Antitrust Context: Parker v. Brown in Constitutional Perspective, 1978
DUKE L.J. 389, 420-22 (1978).
135. See, e.g., AREEDA AND HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, at 230 (identifying market failure as an
alternative approach to state action immunity).
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public efforts to define standards, craft regulations, and implement policy
depend heavily on professional involvement. Nevertheless, it seems inconsistent from an antitrust perspective to subject openly self-regulatory activities to
substantive evaluation for their effects on competition, while excusing tacitly
self-regulatory activities from review if attributable to the state acting in its sovereign capacity. Particularly questionable under the circumstances is the doctrinal requirement for active state supervision, which is applied to state laws
extending antitrust immunity to private parties, because expert professional
activities can seldom be supervised meaningfully. Consequently, medical antitrust scholars have focused their attention mainly on professional licensing
boards and similar governmental or quasi-governmental bodies, and to a lesser
extent on recent statutes conferring “certificates of public advantage” on hospital mergers or similarly attempting to shield medical providers from antitrust
exposure.136
A Copernican view shares this skepticism, mainly because physicians have
maintained political power at the state level disproportionate to their economic
influence. As a result, the Ptolemaic view has greater currency where politically
determined market failures are concerned than where the failures inhere in the
private competitive process.137 Medical antitrust policy, therefore, would be
better served by moving toward a unitary evaluation of both professional selfregulation and state regulation dealing with similar subjects.138 Specifically, we
advocate abandoning the active state supervision requirement of the existing
state action doctrine and subjecting both self- and state-regulation to substantive antitrust scrutiny as to their likely effects on market failure.139 Such a
change is not intended to eviscerate existing regulation. Rather, the goal is to
encourage both regulation and self-regulation that improves the functioning of
medical markets, especially with respect to quality-based competition.

136. Frank P. Grad, The Antitrust Laws and Professional Discipline in Medicine, 1978 DUKE L.J.
443, 454-64, 472-77 (1978) (discussing potential antitrust challenges to medical board activities); Fred J.
Hellinger, Antitrust Enforcement in the Healthcare Industry: The Expanding Scope of State
Enforcement, 33 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1477, 1480-86 (1998) (summarizing the recent activities of
states that have attempted to exempt health care conduct from antitrust liability under the state action
doctrine); GAO, HEALTH CARE: FEDERAL AND STATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS CONCERNING THE
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 10-13 (1994) (detailing the efforts of states to afford hospitals and other
health care providers immunity under the state action doctrine).
137. One could make a similar point about public purchasing at the federal level, especially when
one considers the fact that many of the factors that hamstring Medicare as a market participant derive
from concessions made to secure the AMA’s political support in 1965. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000)
(prohibiting federal interference with medical practice) 42 U.S.C. § 1395a (2000) (assuring free choice
of physicians by patients).
138. In this connection, it is worth noting that most of the restrictions on dental advertising imposed
as a self-regulatory matter by the California Dental Association were not significantly different from
those specified in the California Business & Professions Code. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756,
760 n.1 (1999).
139. John S. Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 739-76
(1986) (arguing that state action immunity should not apply to restraints on trade that arose from
provider “capture” of regulators, did not address a substantial market failure, and were not specifically
exempted by Congress).

SAGE_FMT.DOC

280

10/02/02 1:49 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 65: No. 4

A Copernican approach offers two additional justifications for a similar
result. First, because protection of public health and safety is a traditional
application of state police powers, the state action doctrine has the undesirable
effect of partitioning quality concerns from the competitive process. Subjecting
state regulation to market failure review would reinforce the point that quality
is an intrinsic aspect of medical markets. Second, as will become apparent in
the discussion below, a Copernican analysis posits that sound competition
policy requires connecting antitrust oversight with regulatory processes beyond
demand-side effects on market failures. This approach entails examining the
effects of various market conditions on total social welfare, which should also
be the relevant criterion for democratic decision-making. Applying substantive
review to state action would test the integrity of the political processes at work
in regulating health care and would tend to reveal distortions produced by
interest-group models of public choice.
These considerations could be addressed to a degree by measures that do
not completely overturn the existing state action doctrine. For example, a federal requirement (framed in a constitutionally permissible manner) that states
issue a competition impact statement in connection with particular types of
health care regulation might educate both legislators and market competitors.
Over time, however, it might be advisable to move toward more comprehensive
federal regulation of competitive conditions in health care, which would at least
pre-empt narrow state regulations that can be shown to retard competition primarily to serve private interests.140
C. Beyond Traditional Market Failure
The market failure considerations discussed above primarily involve
demand-side effects and the interactions between identifiable buyers and identifiable sellers of health care services. By contrast, certain collective action
problems affect the health care production function, so that solving them potentially confers social benefits by shifting the supply curve as well.141 Some, like
incomplete information and medical innovation, involve partial public goods.

140. Although line-drawing would inevitably be very difficult, one could imagine a “state plan”
mechanism that allowed states to demonstrate that their own regulatory approaches to health care were
sufficiently cohesive to receive federal deference. Under the Clinton administration’s failed health
reform proposal, for example, states that decided to implement a comprehensive “single-payer” system
were entitled to opt out of the more market-based federal regime. Health Security Act, H.R. 3600,
103d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 1221-24 (1993) (setting forth requirements for state single-payer systems).
141. The production function is critical in health policy in part because, as Arrow observed, various
market failures render the process of delivering medical care synonymous with the care itself. See
Arrow, supra note 35, at 949 (“[T]he product and the activity of production are identical.”); see also
Lawrence R. Jacobs, Politics of America’s Supply State: Health Reform and Technology, HEALTH AFF.,
Summer 1995, at 143, 146-52 (analyzing the political failures that prevent the United States from
employing supply-side constraints on health care); Thomas Rice, Can Markets Give Us the Health
System We Want?, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 383, 416 (criticizing market approaches to health
policy because they focus exclusively on influencing demand, not supply).
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Others, like risk-segmentation and therapeutic trust, involve negative externalities.
These issues are currently addressed, if at all, in self-regulatory or regulatory, rather than competitive terms. In fact, many of these issues represent
social concerns that, under Ptolemaic conditions, were entrusted to the medical
profession either directly (for example, the physician-patient relationship) or
indirectly (for example, public funding for scientific innovation and clinical dissemination). By and large, physicians support incorporating such concerns into
overall health system governance in the future, but they are understandably
uncomfortable with the notion that physicians will no longer have exclusive
control over how these values are reflected in the health care system—which
inevitably suggests some criticism of the way the profession has handled them
to date.
Can social concerns over system productivity and performance be brought
within an economic framework, which remains the lingua franca of antitrust
even under Copernican assumptions?142 To do so, one would have to make
changes to both antitrust doctrine and the nature of evidence deemed admissible in court. Specifically, one would need to adopt a total social welfare standard for judging the efficiency of putative restraints on trade, which would
allow harm to consumers as a second-best solution as long as efficiency gains
within the health care system exceeded losses.143 One might even need to
impose distributional requirements with respect to the disposition of net gains.
These considerations raise complicated questions concerning public-private
interaction over the scope, composition, and character of markets, and serve as
a reminder that markets are also social institutions. Interventions in this context create opportunities for potentially welfare-enhancing private collaboration
and constructive forms of public intervention, but also risk debilitating market
failure and anti-competitive manipulation.
It is also a close question whether these issues can be factored into antitrust
oversight without corrupting the objectivity of economic analysis. On the one
hand, traditional economics is well validated as an empirical tool; on the other
hand, economic rhetoric can be socially constructed to serve normative goals.144
Overall, however, our empirical work suggests the importance in health care of
bringing competition and regulation into proximity at an interface, not a
142. They can certainly be brought in if one revives early understandings of antitrust law as
designed to preserve economic structures that foster democracy rather than efficiency, and the welfare
of people as citizens rather than consumers. This idea still appeals to communitarians. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Sandel, The Constitution of the Procedural Republic: Liberal Rights and Civic Virtues, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 6-11 (1997).
143. See Hammer et al., supra note 86, at 853-75 (explaining “intramarket” second-best solutions).
144. See Avery W. Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics, 94 MICH. L. REV.
2229, 2240-50 (1996) (distinguishing normative from positive welfare economics); Uwe E. Reinhardt,
Can Efficiency in Health Care be Left to the Market?, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 967, 981-84
(evaluating the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion in normative terms); see also Paul Menzel et al.,
Toward a Broader View of Values in Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Health, HASTINGS CENTER
REPORT May, 1999 at 7 (arguing in favor of adapting cost-benefit analysis to reflect atypical social
preferences).
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boundary, and we believe that the factors discussed below help define that
interface. Still, we acknowledge that extending antitrust analysis to issues
beyond transactions between individual buyers and sellers risks drowning in a
flood of good intentions. Furthermore, untethering antitrust courts from conventional economics may render them both standardless and unaccountable as
legal institutions.145 We therefore reiterate that, although we are obviously not
devotees of the Chicago School, neither are we regulatory wolves clad as competitive sheep.146
1. Medical Knowledge.
Lack of information is usually considered a demand-side market failure. For
example, providing information about quality to consumers reduces uncertainty
associated with purchasing, which can both increase aggregate demand and
channel demand to higher quality providers. In health care, as discussed above,
informational asymmetries between physicians and patients, and among newer
participants in medical markets, are theoretically compatible with this understanding.
It has become clear in recent years, however, that the informational base of
health care is not only asymmetric, but grossly incomplete.147 Large, unexplained, regional variations exist in treatment of common diseases, which have
proved resistant to correction through conventional mechanisms for disseminating new research findings. Variation is compounded by the absence of economic incentives for rationalizing American medicine during most of the past
half-century.148
Because care is over-used and misused in many settings, quality improvements, in theory, may decrease health expenditures rather than increase them.149
The prospect of providing comparable, or even higher, levels of quality at
145. The Sherman Act is unusual among federal statutes for its generality. Enforcement is
therefore a “common law” endeavor, which unsettles the Supreme Court as much as it empowers lower
courts to address the equities of specific cases. The Court has been unwilling to risk similar expansions
of federal common law adjudication in other areas of health care. In Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,
231-37 (2000), for example, the Court seemingly allowed its visceral distaste for federal common law to
justify abdicating responsibility for specifying employers’, health plans’, and possibly even physicians’
roles as ERISA fiduciaries. See Sage, supra note 103, at 221-22 (discussing Pegram). See generally
Peter L. Strauss, Courts or Tribunals?: Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2002) (urging the restoration of “judging” authority to federal courts).
146. Perhaps we should draft a truly Copernican preface to this article and address it to Judges
Posner and Easterbrook rather than the Vatican!
147. See Sage, supra note 118, at 1771-80 (discussing incomplete information and the desirability of
improving health system productivity as a justification for mandatory information disclosure laws).
148. See R. Adam Dudley et al., The Impact of Financial Incentives on Quality Health Care, 76
MILBANK Q. 649, 661-62 (1998) (linking financial arrangements in fee-for-service and prepayment with
incentives to underprovide and overprovide care); Mark R. Chassin & Robert W. Galvin, The Urgent
Need to Improve Health Care Quality: Institute of Medicine National Roundtable on Health Care
Quality, 280 JAMA 1000, 1002 (1998) (discussing problems associated with the misuse of care).
149. See Jane E. Sisk, Increased Competition and the Quality of Health Care, 76 MILBANK Q. 687,
691 (1998) (“Studies have not found a consistent relationship between the cost and quality of medical
providers. For example, studies of ambulatory practices caring for Medicare beneficiaries in Maryland
found that technical quality varied by the type of facility, but not its costliness.”).
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reduced costs was a major moral justification for the growth of managed care
and was often associated with proposals for “clinical practice guidelines” that
improved overall clinical benefit as well as cost-effectiveness.150 This effort has
produced only modest successes. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that,
despite their scientific veneer, guidelines are often consciously or unconsciously
motivated by self-interested biases as to what constitutes appropriate clinical
care. However, another part stems from insufficient incentives to invest in
these processes, because gains cannot easily be appropriated by the innovator.
This public goods aspect of health care production suggests that a competition
policy seeking to maximize total social welfare would look favorably on collective strategies for knowledge generation (figuring out the right thing to do) and
dissemination (getting people to do it).
One aspect of this process likely involves the formation of large firms or
clinically integrated networks, even if they come at some cost to consumers in
terms of market concentration.151 Paralleling our notion of a Copernican transformation in health care, the growing literature on medical errors and patient
safety rejects the traditional focus on individual physician behavior and emphasizes system-based accountability and improvement,152 often associated with
larger institutions.153 Our empiric review of antitrust litigation may shed some
light on this question. We observed a large number of cases in which courts
rejected antitrust challenges to hospitals’ efforts to control physician practice,
usually through exclusive contracting.154 We analogize these cases to modern
antitrust treatment of vertical restraints between manufacturers and dealers or
distributors in other industries, which allows restrictions on intra-brand competition in order to improve inter-brand competition.155 In the usual distribution
case, however, the justification for intra-brand restrictions is to induce dealers
to invest in brand promotion, offer free service, and provide other nonprice
benefits by solving the free rider problem among them. Physicians, by contrast,
do not need similar encouragement regarding nonprice competition. What they
do require is coordination aimed at improved productivity.156
150. Robert H. Brook et al., Measuring Quality of Care, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 966, 968 (1996)
(discussing the role and function of clinical guidelines).
151. In this respect, the 1996 Joint Policy Statements issued by FTC and DOJ were quite forwardlooking, although the agencies were dealing with the practicalities of joint ventures among health care
providers rather than large normative issues. See 1996 Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
¶13,153, at 20,814 (Aug. 5, 1996).
152. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
153. William M. Sage, Principles, Pragmatism, and Medical Injury, 286 JAMA 226, 227 (2001)
(observing that “[Studdert and Brennan’s] argument implies that a superior form of medical
organization exists”); David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, No-Fault Compensation for Medical
Injuries: The Prospect for Error Prevention, 286 JAMA 217, 219-20 (2001) (advocating institutional
accountability for medical error).
154. See Hammer & Sage, supra note 7, at 613-14.
155. See Hammer, How Doctors Became Distributors, supra note 40.
156. One can regard Ambroze v. Aetna Health Plans in this light. No. 95 CIV. 6631, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7274 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1996). The physician plaintiffs argued that Aetna’s ban on balance
billing was preventing them from offering higher-price, higher-quality services to patients. Id. at *14.
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2. Technology and Political Action.
Technological innovation suffers from a different set of problems. As Lawrence Jacobs points out, the United States differs from all other industrialized
nations in its adamant refusal to impose supply-side constraints on medical
technology.157 To the contrary, generous government policies regarding basic
research funding, incentives for technology transfer, and reimbursement under
Medicare have resulted in unparalleled innovation and dissemination of patentable medical technology.158 Although some commentators consider this proliferation of property rights efficient,159 it is also possible that it has gridlocked
efforts to rationalize innovation and improve overall system productivity.160
Oddly, one might view the non-profit hospital merger cases, which are otherwise aberrant in their seeming rejection of core economic principles of antitrust
law, as more progressive in terms of technology and productivity.161 The
medium-sized markets where most of these cases take place may regard the
presence of sophisticated technology within the community as an on-off proposition, in which case the merger may seem to reduce duplication, free up
resources to acquire skills or equipment not currently available, and facilitate
rational planning.
Earlier discussions of public purchasing and state action demonstrated that
governmental policies can have unpredictable and untoward effects on competition in health care. In other words, political failure frequently compounds
market failure. Incentives for strategic manipulation of public processes are
perhaps most intense where (1) the government action creates a product or
market that would otherwise not exist; and (2) the stakes are structured in a
zero-sum fashion—action in favor of one competitor comes at the sake of
another competitor. Whereas any qualified provider can feed at the Medicare
trough, for example, only one company can lay claim to an exclusive patent
right. Moreover, private purchasing and payment decisions are often linked to
public judgments, creating perverse incentives.162 While it would be neither posThe court could have justified the practice as fostering interbrand competition between Aetna and
other health plans by forcing physicians to reduce non-price competition and improve costeffectiveness.
157. See Jacobs, supra note 141, at 145-46.
158. See Rebecca Eisenberg, The Shifting Functional Balance of Patents and Drug Regulation,
HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 119, 121-24 (examining how patents and regulation act in tandem to
limit competition for prescription drugs).
159. See J.D. KLEINKE, OXYMORONS: THE MYTH OF A U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (2001)
(criticizing efforts to improve efficiency through managed care and praising technologic innovation).
160. Cf. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (analyzing the observation that property rights can create
collective action problems as well as solve them).
161. See, e.g., FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (allowing
merger to monopoly of the two largest hospitals in Grand Rapids on the theory that, as non-profit
institutions, they would not abuse market power).
162. For example, the manufacturer of Claritin, Schering-Plough, has been arguing to the FDA that
its product is too dangerous to be sold without a prescription. Its motive for doing so is the fact that, if
Claritin is authorized for over-the-counter sale, private insurers will stop covering it, forcing the
manufacturer to reduce its price. Predictably, the insurers argued to the FDA that Claritin is safer than
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sible nor desirable to have federal antitrust law operate in a counter-majoritarian, apolitical vacuum, the extent to which politics influences health care
markets suggests the need for more actively policing strategic and anti-competitive behavior at the private-public regulatory interface controlling biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices.
Our empirical findings reveal insufficient attention by antitrust courts to
technological innovation.163 Few private plaintiffs litigate these cases, and
judges often defer the innovation-related antitrust claims that are asserted to
other legal forums, such as the Patent Office, the FDA, Medicare coverage
determinations, or the International Trade Commission (ITC), which enforces
United States trade law.164 A particular obstacle to innovation-based antitrust
litigation is that plaintiffs fail to meet legal requirements regarding standing and
antitrust injury, usually because potential innovators who are being deterred by
current competitors may not yet be in the market, and, in any event, their
damages are speculative.165
Furthermore, a significant number of defendants successfully argue that
their conduct is shielded by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which protects
political action even if engaged in collectively by competitors, and even if it
produces anti-competitive effects.166 In recent years, the Supreme Court has so
narrowly construed the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine that it
is virtually impossible to maintain an antitrust suit if there is the slightest objec-

common antihistamine medications such as Benadryl. The FDA recently recommended that over-thecounter sale be allowed. See Milt Freudenheim & Melanie Petersen, The Drug-Price Express Runs Into
a Wall, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001, at C1.
163. See Hammer & Sage, supra note 7, at 626-31.
164. The federal enforcement agencies have paid closer attention to the connection between
antitrust law and medical innovation and have litigated major cases involving pharmaceuticals and
medical devices, perhaps because they were under pressure from Congress not to target only physicians
and hospitals.
165. See, e.g., Barton & Pittinos v. SmithKline Beecham, 942 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 118
F.3d 178 (3rd Cir. 1997) (involving a pharmaceutical marketing company that was developing a new
method of marketing and distributing hepatitis-B vaccine to nursing homes); Practice Perfect, Inc. v.
Hamilton County Pharm. Ass’n, 732 F. Supp. 798 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (involving a prescription
repackaging business that prepared labels and dosages for drugs and sold them to physicians, who
would then sell the drugs directly to patients).
166. Some Noerr-Pennington cases arise in patent disputes, see C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 System, Inc.,
157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reversing trial verdict and holding that the patent suit was not
objectively baseless and therefore could not constitute sham litigation); Mitek Surgical Prod., Inc. v.
Arthrex, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1309 (D. Utah 1998) (granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on
defendant’s counterclaim, holding that the patent infringement suit was not objectively baseless); and
Boston Sci. Corp. v. Schneider, 983 F. Supp. 245 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that underlying patent
litigation suits were immune from antitrust challenge because they were not objectively baseless),
others concur immunized proceedings before the FDA, see Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 770 F.
Supp. 1053 (D. Md. 1991) (antedating Professional Real Estate, the court held that the defendant’s
efforts to gain FDA approval for their generic drugs using an ANDA constituted Noerr-protected
conduct), while others find immunized conduct before the International Trade Commission (“ITC”),
see Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119 (3rd Cir. 1999) (finding an independent objective
basis existed for ITC suit and therefore that conduct was immunized); Bio-Technology Gen. Corp. v.
Genentech, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that ITC proceedings were not objectively
baseless and were therefore Noerr-protected).
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tive merit to the defendant’s action.167 The policy problem is that there is a wide
range of behavior that may have an objective legal basis as understood by the
courts, but where the intended purpose is to leverage the government process to
achieve private, anti-competitive objectives. Without antitrust accountability,
however, there are few meaningful sanctions that can be applied by the Patent
Office, the FDA, or the ITC to discourage abuses.
The anti-competitive implications of Noerr-Pennington for health care have
not escaped notice in the legal literature, but have been interpreted in
Ptolemaic terms.168 When one views the health care system as physician-centered, the problem is that physicians could collectively “petition” state medical
boards and other quasi-governmental bodies that were themselves dominated
by physicians, with the result that blatant cartel behavior would be exempt from
scrutiny.169 The proposed remedy for this situation—as for state action defenses
under similar circumstances—would be to disqualify physician-controlled
bodies from the protected category of public decision-makers.
Copernican analysis reveals a more extensive problem, with the worst risks
to competition arising from political action involving winner-take-all, patented
medical innovations, albeit before legitimate public agencies. To remedy the
situation, antitrust law might revive an economics-based balancing test proposed in some earlier appellate cases: whether the expected benefit from the
petitioning activity, calculated as the direct benefit from government action discounted by the probability of obtaining it, exceeds the costs associated with
petitioning.170 Alternatively, one could devise a standard to prevent parties from
bootstrapping partially legitimate claims into larger attacks against competitors
by predicating antitrust liability on establishing that the political action
requested exceeded in scope what was justified by the objectively legitimate
basis for petitioning.
3. Insurance, Access to Health Services, and Social Welfare.
With insurance, the traditional information asymmetry in health care is
turned on its head—consumers typically have better information as to their
medical risk than insurers. This invites a range of strategic behavior on both
sides of the transaction: Consumers are susceptible to moral hazard and adverse
selection, while insurers exploit these tendencies in addition to defending
against them. For example, insurers may encourage high risk patients to disenroll, and may market selectively and structure benefits so as to attract rela167. See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60
(1993).
168. See Mark A. Thimke, Physician Influence: Applying Noerr-Pennington to the Medical
Profession, 1978 DUKE L.J. 701, 705-26 (1978) (discussing the doctrine’s limited applicability to quasipublic self-regulatory organizations).
169. See id.
170. See Premier Elec. Const. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 814 F.2d 358, 372 (7th Cir. 1987)
(opinion by Judge Posner suggesting that cost-benefit analysis can distinguish lawful from unlawful
litigation); Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982) (opinion by Judge
Easterbrook taking the same approach).
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tively healthy people.171 If the relationship between pricing and risk becomes
too attenuated, the insurance pool may collapse.
Insurance market failures were well known in Ptolemaic accounts of health
care competition. Early health insurance markets, however, were often captive
financing vehicles for medical providers (Blue Cross for hospitals and Blue
Shield for physicians), were sometimes subject to premium regulation that took
the edge off competitive impulses, and were under only mild pressure from consumers to keep prices low.172 As a result, insurance funded the physician-patient
relationship but rarely interfered with it, and the tools medicine had at its disposal to treat the sick were usually so limited that they were available through
charity (or at least cross-subsidization) if patients were for some reason uninsurable. Insurance market failures grew central to policy analysis only when
cost became of sufficient concern, mainly to employers as health plan sponsors,
that insurers were forced to compete on price by involving themselves directly
in the provision of medical services.173
With the advent of managed care, however, competition in the insurance
aspect of health coverage may be in tension with competition in the service
aspect. A modern health plan can be price-competitive in two distinct ways: by
rendering care efficiently, and by keeping sick people out. Not surprisingly,
health plans will tend toward the latter course if the relative profitability of
manipulating risk pools is significantly greater than that of improving the costeffectiveness of clinical care.174 There is also the potential for direct harm if consciously providing lower quality care to selected high-risk patients hastens their
disenrollment.
A Copernican perspective recognizes that enhancing social welfare by
improving the “productivity” of the health care system requires consensus on
exactly what it produces. Is a health insurance system that makes cheap coverage available to healthy people “productive?” Or is such a system only productive if it delivers more and better health care? This is a social question that is
far from settled.175 As a result, combined products such as those offered by
171. Sisk, supra note 149, at 700.
172. See, e.g., STARR, supra note 42, at 290-334 (describing health insurance between 1930 and
1950).
173. This was predicted by Arrow. See Arrow, supra note 35, at 962 (noting that, because of moral
hazard, “market forces, therefore, tend to be replaced by direct institutional control”).
174. Some commentators paint a fairly dire portrait. “There is also the inescapable conflict
generated by the fact that in our current system, strategies to avoid risky patients will almost certainly
yield more cost savings than strategies to improve quality.” Marcia Angell & Jerome P. Kassirer,
Quality and the Medical Market Place—Following Elephants, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 883, 883 (1996).
No health plan can be successful by consciously cultivating a reputation of providing inferior care in the
aggregate. The competitive demands for “quality” are quite strong. Tradeoffs between risk selection
and quality are more likely to appear on the margins, such as in the structure of plan benefits or in the
treatment of particular subpopulations.
175. Recent scholarship on insurance emphasizes its chimerical properties, and the variability of
social responses to it. See Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture of
Insurance and Responsibility (2002) (collecting essays suggesting that insurance both affects and is
affected by other social issues); see also William M. Sage, Insurance and the Moral Plurality, HEALTH
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today’s health plans generate a range of expectations, many of them inconsistent, and create significant difficulties for both private transactions and public
oversight.
Even if a Copernican view of antitrust tolerates potentially anti-competitive
activity that overcomes market failure, whether the market has failed depends
on what the market is. Should antitrust look favorably on conduct that suppresses risk-based competition,176 or should it attempt to maintain market availability of both risk-based and service-based insurance products? The existing
framework for insurance industry supervision adds complexity to the task.
“Core” aspects of insurance—such as sharing actuarial information that
enhances estimation of risk—are expressly exempted from federal antitrust law
by the McCarran-Ferguson Act,177 which was motivated by a desire to leave
insurance regulation to the states at a time when understandings of trade and
commerce would otherwise have swept insurance into a competitive framework
overseen by the Sherman Act.178 By contrast, activities by health insurers that
relate to service delivery, such as contracting with medical providers, are typically subject to federal antitrust enforcement.179
Finally, how does one address concerns about unequal access to health care?
These considerations seem an odd fit with competition policy, but there is little
doubt that health system “productivity” can reasonably be defined to encompass them, both at the level of individual patient care and at the level of society.
Reputable accounts of health insurance regard it as a statement of social solidarity.180 People value charity, and suffer when others’ suffering is not relieved.
Within individual therapeutic relationships, trust has both intrinsic and instrumental value,181 and “pick-your-poison” forms of competition can be “anti-trust”
in this sense of the term. All of these factors raise the possibility that overtly
competitive health insurance systems that emphasize value-for-money rather
AFF., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 294, 295 (reviewing Baker and Simon’s Embracing Risk and noting that
pluralism regarding the meaning of insurance suggests that “change will be possible only through
coalition, not consensus”).
176. Various forms of risk adjustment are the most commonly touted solution to risk-selection
problems: “The overall goal should be to convince plans that they will receive for each enrollee a
payment that accurately reflects the amount of money an efficient plan would need to provide highquality care to a patient with the enrollee’s medical problems.” Dudley et al., supra note 148, at 677-78.
Risk adjustment, however, raises notoriously difficult technical as well as practical problems. See
Joseph P. Newhouse et al., Risk Adjustment and Medicare: Taking a Closer Look, HEALTH AFF.,
Sept./Oct. 1997, at 26, (discussing limitations of existing risk adjusters and the efforts to risk adjust
Medicare managed care programs).
177. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000).
178. See generally Charles D. Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Antitrust Exemption for
Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587 (1978).
179. See, e.g., Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979) (holding that
agreements between insurers and pharmacies were not the “business of insurance,” and therefore not
protected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act from antitrust attack).
180. Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y &
L. 287, 290-94 (1993) (distinguishing social solidarity visions of insurance from private risk-reduction).
181. See Mark A. Hall et al., Trust in Physicians and Medical Institutions: What Is It, Can It Be
Measured, and Does It Matter?, 79 MILBANK Q. 613, 613 (2001).
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than compassion, whether tied to risk or to service delivery, harm the aggregate
“production function” and, therefore, can be welfare-reducing.182
The non-profit hospital merger cases capture some of these values in antitrust litigation, though admittedly in ways that strain legal doctrine and economic analysis. In FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., for example, the court
looked to the interests of potential consumers as well as actual ones, and
included in the former category individuals who cannot afford medical care but
nonetheless need it.183 In addition, the court’s impassioned defense of the
virtues of non-profit hospitals can be seen as a reaction to the implicit accusation by the enforcement agencies that the merger was ill-motivated as well as
economically anti-competitive. To the communities where health facilities and
professionals are located, believing in their good intentions is part of benefiting
from their services. Competition policy should at least recognize these beliefs
and effects. While it is doubtful that private markets will ever independently
produce levels of coverage and access that meet social expectations, this does
not mean that it is never desirable to use markets as a tool to achieve social
objectives where markets have a strong comparative advantage over regulatory
alternatives, perhaps by manipulating the initial conditions under which markets operate.
V
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have used the analogy of Copernican astronomy to suggest
that understanding the dramatic change wrought by managed care requires a
conceptual reorientation regarding the meaning of competition in health care
and its appropriate legal and regulatory oversight. Although the astronomer’s
revolution, which aims only to account for what exists, differs fundamentally
from the policy-maker’s revolution, which seeks not only to describe but to
improve, both share the belief that misperceiving the world around us limits our
potential for technical and social progress. We believe that the American
health care system’s relatively recent embrace of competition—while a dramatic
event—may be failing because it was not accompanied by an accurate understanding of the system’s dynamic structure, particularly with respect to quality.
We believe that conventional antitrust oversight should give way to a more
holistic competition policy—not only to account factually for managed care, but
also to secure the gains that have been achieved and move productively ahead.
The unacceptable alternative is to allow complexities and contradictions to
accumulate to the point that society despairs of resolving them and retreats into

182. Relaxing the intramarket second-best limitation, it is also worth pointing out that health may
increase social wealth through enhanced overall productivity, as well as wealthier people simply being
healthier. See David E. Bloom & David Canning, The Health and Wealth of Nations, 287 SCIENCE
1207, 1209 (2000).
183. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1299-1300 & n.5 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
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nostalgia or worse. It would be a great tragedy for the “Managed Care Revolution” to be followed by the health care equivalent of the “Cultural Revolution.”

